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Abstract
This paper studies the Greek economy in the aftermath of the 2007-8 global
crisis looking for barriers to, and engines of, growth. We use a micro-founded
macroeconomic model calibrated to Greece. We first study the years of the
debt crisis between 2008 and 2016 and then the recent covid-19 pandemic.
Departing from 2008, our simulations show that the adopted economic ad-
justment program (the fiscal austerity mix combined with the fiscal and
monetary assistance provided by the EU, ECB and IMF), jointly with the
observed deterioration in institutional quality (the degree of protection of
property rights) can explain most (around 23% of GDP) of the cumulative
loss in GDP in the data (around 26% of GDP) between 2008 and 2016. In
particular, the economic adjustment program can explain a fall of around
13%, while the deterioration in property rights accounts for another 10%.
Counterfactual simulations, on the other hand, show that this loss could
have been around 10% only, if the country had followed a different fiscal
policy mix; if the degree of product marker liberalization was closer to that
in the core euro zone countries; and, above all, if institutional quality in
Greece had simply remained at its pre-crisis level. On the other hand, we
show that, in the absence of the offi cial fiscal bailouts, the depression would
be much deeper, while the accommodative role played by the quantitative
policies of the ECB has been vital to the Greek economy. Finally, departing
from 2019, we quantify the impact of the covid-19 pandemic under various
policy scenaria. A loss of around 8.5% of GDP and a sharp jump of public
debt seem to be unavoidable during 2020 but, like in the case of the debt
crisis, the duration of the new crisis depends crucially on the policy mix
chosen.
JEL classification: O4, H6, E02.
Keywords: Growth, macroeconomic policy, institutions.
1 Introduction
Among the euro zone (EZ) periphery countries hit by the global financial
crisis of 2007-8, Greece experienced the worst decline and the biggest need
for international support.1 Between 2008 and 2016, Greece lost more than
one fourth of its GDP. It also had to rely on a number of offi cial or unoffi cial
programs of financial assistance provided in various forms by the EU, the
ECB and the IMF; only the three offi cial fiscal bailouts between 2010 and
2015 amounted to around 290 billion euros. Although GDP growth managed
to rebound in 2017, the recovery was fragile (driven mainly by net exports
and private consumption) even before the eruption of the new economic
crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. For instance, at the
end of 2019, private investment remained at around 11% of GDP only,
public debt was around 175% of GDP, external liabilities were around 140%
of GDP with the current account still in deficit, unemployment was around
17% and, perhaps more importantly, Greece scored poorly in institutional
quality vis-à-vis other EU and OECD countries.2 Besides, as part of the
various bailout programs, around 70% of Greek public debt is owned by
public institutions of the EU and the ECB.
Aim of this paper The aim of this paper is fourfold. First, we search
for the drivers of the Greek debt crisis. This includes driving forces and
propagation mechanisms through which the driving forces shaped equilib-
rium outcomes and in particular the big output loss between 2008 and 2016.
Second, we conduct a decomposion exercise to quantify the relative contri-
bution of various driving forces, as they are in the data, to this output loss.
Third, building upon the first two steps, we search for counter-factual sce-
naria that could have possibly given better outcomes between 2008 and the
covid-19 pandemic. Fourth, we study what can happen from now on given
the new crisis triggered by the covid-19 outbreak. Putting all this together,
our aim is to identify the barriers to, and the engines of, growth. This helps
us to draw some macroeconomic policy lessons that could be useful in the
future. We also study distributional implications.
1For the Greek crisis, see e.g. Sinn (2014, 2015), Ioannides and Pissarides (2015),
De Grauwe (2016), Alesina et al. (2019, chapter 8), Brunnermeier and Reis (2019) and
Alogoskoufis (2019). For formal models, see e.g. Arellano and Bai (2016), Gourinchas et
al. (2017), Papageorgiou and Vourvachaki (2017), Economides et al. (2017), Glomm et
al. (2018), Dellas et al. (2018) and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2019). See also the papers in
the volumes edited by Meghir et al. (2017) and Bournakis et al. (2017). See below for
details and how our work differs.
2 In Greece, weak institutions are captured by various indices measuring the poor
enforcement of the law, vandalism and violence, an ineffi cient public administration, a
labyrinth of bureaucracy, a slow judicial system, laws and regulations that limit competi-
tion, tax evasion, poor education (PISA) scores, etc. For institutional quality in Greece
relative to other countries, see e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2009), Masuch et al. (2018),
Afonso and Kazemi (2016), Kollintzas et al. (2018) and Christou et al. (2020). See below
for further details.
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A brief recollection of events To place our work in context, we need
to recall the key events in Greece over the euro period. The Greek debt cri-
sis should not have come as a surprise; it had all the symptoms of a typical
international crisis (see e.g. Lorenzoni (2014)). Greece was already in imbal-
ance when the global financial crisis erupted in 2007-8. From the late 1990s
to 2008, the country enjoyed an exceptional economic boom and declining
unemployment. But this was driven by a big rise in private demand and
pro-cyclical fiscal policies, both of which were financed by borrowing from
optimistic banks in Greece and Northern Europe. The demand-driven boom
led to accumulation of large private, public and external debts. It also led to
rises in wages, prices and unit labor costs and hence to losses in competitive-
ness. In addition, and perhaps this went unnoticed, Greece displayed a big
asymmetry in institutional quality (as described above) relative to its EU
partners. Then, in 2009, amid an unfavorable environment (the "sudden"
recognition of the above imbalances, unpleasant news about the country’s
public finances, big riots in Athens in December 2008 combined with political
polarization, the release of reports by the European Commission and rating
agencies expressing fears of sovereign insolvency, etc), confidence was under-
mined, expectations were reversed, GDP collapsed, debts-to-GDP exploded,
and all this became a vicious cycle. Greece, along with Ireland and Portu-
gal, was shut out from private capital markets and the Greek government
had to resort to its first offi cial fiscal bailout provided by the EU and the
IMF in early 2010. Nevertheless, the fear of default rose again, insolvency
was admitted by all and, in 2012, the Greek government defaulted on its
bonds held by private creditors. But again this was not enough. Greece had
to receive two more offi cial fiscal rescue loans provided by other EU states,
EU institutions (EFSF, EFSM, ESM) and the IMF in 2012 and 2015. At
the same time, and this has been since the very beginning of the global
financial crisis, the ECB provided a plethora of supportive quantitative, or
balance-sheet, policies (e.g. direct or indirect intervention in the market
for Greek government bonds; the support of private banks through a full
allotment lending policy, the relaxation of collateral requirements and the
provision of ELA; the issuance of cross-border liquidity that compensated for
abrupt private capital inflows and known as TARGET2 liabilities; etc). All
this complex financial (fiscal and monetary) assistance was offered at much
more favorable terms than markets would have imposed on Greece. On the
other hand, it was conditioned on a severe fiscal austerity plan monitored by
the EC, the ECB and the IMF. Although the real motives behind the finan-
cial assistance, as well as the rationale of severe fiscal austerity, have been
lively debated (see e.g. Alesina et al (2019, chapter 8)), this so-called Eco-
nomic Adjustment Program, combining austerity and assistance, enabled
Greece to remain in the euro area. However, fiscal austerity and economic
depression, fuelled by political polarization and populism, were associated
with a further worsening of institutional quality. The latter is reflected into
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indices measuring, for example, the rule of law, regulatory quality, and po-
litical instability and violence, which show a sharp deteriorarion during the
debt crisis years. Notably, these are the indices typically used to construct
measures of the degree of protection of property rights and, as is widely
recognized, property rights shape incentives and are fundamental drivers
of sustainable growth.3 Finally, after a diffi cult decade, Greece exited its
Economic Adjustment Program in August 2018 but, as said above, its mod-
erate recovery path that started in 2017 has been abruptly disrupted by the
pandemic shock in early 2020.
Our model Our model will embed most of the above distinct features of
the Greek economy. The vehicle of analysis is a medium-scale micro-founded
macroeconomic model of a small open economy participating in a currency
union. In addition to a number of real and nominal frictions commonly used
by the quantitative macroeconomic literature, the model incorporates - in an
attempt to mimic the Greek case - a rather detailed public sector including
public employees as a separate income class, problems of institutional qual-
ity in the form of ill-defined property rights that trigger anti-social activities,
and, during the debt crisis, international financial assistance combined with
fiscal austerity. To understand better the menu of macro policy instruments
used, we model separately the Treasury (fiscal authority) and the national
central bank participating in the Eurosystem (monetary authority). In other
words, the model incorporates the main ingredients of the Economic Adjust-
ment Program as described above, namely, fiscal austerity combined with
international financial assistance, where the latter includes the offi cial fiscal
bailouts as well as balance-sheet, or quantitative, monetary policies by the
Eurosystem. The revenue from the offi cial fiscal bailouts make up for the
loss of government revenue from being shut out from private capital markets
and this happens at non-market interest rates. At the same time, financial
frictions (as in Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011)), as well as the issuance
of TARGET2 liabilities as part of the monetary base of the national cen-
tral bank (see Sinn (2014) and Whelan (2014, 2017)), provide the channels
through which quantitative, or balance sheet, monetary policies, as allowed
by the ECB, can have real effects and thus - like the offi cial fiscal bailouts -
"alleviate the fiscal burden" (see Reis (2017)). A more detailed description
of our model can be found in subsection 2.1 below before we present the for-
mal model. The model is solved numerically distinguishing two sub-periods:
the years of the debt crisis between 2008 and 2019, and the new era marked
by the pandemic shock in early 2020.
Main results for the sovereign debt crisis Our simulations show
that the Economic Adjustment Program (namely, the fiscal austerity mix
3For the key importance of property rights among other measures of institutional qual-
ity, see e.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Grossman (2001), Rodrik (2003), Dixit (2004), Ace-
moglu (2009, chapter 4), Besley and Persson (2009), Besley and Ghatak (2010), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2019) and many others.
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combined with the offi cial fiscal bailouts and the various types of mone-
tary accommodation provided by the ES), jointly with developments in in-
stitutional quality (specifically, the deterioration of protection of property
rights), can account for most of the cumulative loss in GDP between 2008
and 2016. In particular, departing from 2008, when we feed our model with
the Economic Adjustment Program and an index of property rights, both as
they are recorded in the data, the model, via its propagation mechanisms,
produces around 23% fall in GDP between 2008 and 2016 as compared to
around 26% in the data. The Economic Adjustment Program accounts for
13% and the deterioration in property rights adds another 10%.
On the other hand, counterfactual scenarios during the debt crisis im-
ply the following. First, things could have been much worse. Despite the
conflicting views about the content of the bail-out program, especially re-
garding its fiscal austerity preconditions, our numerical simulations imply
that financial assistance (provided by other EU counties and institutions,
the ECB and the IMF) has helped the Greek economy to avoid the worst.
For instance, if the fiscal needs were financed by, say, higher income taxes
rather than by the three offi cial fiscal bailouts, the loss in output would
have been tremendous, other things equal. Also, even if one is willing to
make the unrealistic assumption that the Greek government were able to
keep selling its bonds to the private market, the high market interest rates
it would have to pay would have led to a bigger output loss than that in
the data. Besides, when we make the assumption that the ECB did not fol-
low an accommodative policy towards Greece, the model ceases to exhibit
a (stable) solution implying (to the extent that one trusts our model) that
this scenario would be nonfeasible, other things equal. Second, things could
also have been better. The output loss could have been significantly smaller
if some things had been done slightly differently. In particular, the output
loss during 2008 and 2016 could have been around 10% only (always relative
to the departure year of 2008), if the country had followed an alternative
fiscal policy mix (for example, a cut in income taxes, or an increase in public
investment, both financed by a cut in tranfer payments), if reforms in the
product market had been adopted and implemented in a faster and/or more
effective way so as the degree of product market liberalization to get closer
to that in the core EZ countries; and, above all, if institutional quality had
not deteriorated since 2008 but had simply remained at its pre-crisis level.
It has to be emphasized that improvements in these areas did not have to
be in the area of fantasy; in our counterfactuals, we assume small changes
vis-a-vis the values in the data. That is, small changes could have made
things much better.
Main predictions for the new pandemic crisisWe use the model to
quantify the impact of the recent covid-19 pandemic on the Greek economy
under different actual and hypothetical scenaria. Following Eichenbaum et
al (2020), we model the pandemic shock as a temporary adverse labour sup-
4
ply shock. This mimics the effects of the necessitated containment measures
on labor supply. Departing from the year 2019, and assuming a rather mod-
erate value for the adverse labor supply shock that lasts during 2020 only,
our simulations show that in 2020, and in the fictional case of no policy reac-
tion, the Greek economy could suffer an output loss of around 12% relative
to 2019 and public debt to GDP could jump to more than 220%. This shows
the big vulnerability of the Greek economy to supply shocks even of rela-
tively small magnitude. Policy responses, on the other hand, can mitigate
the economic damage. For example, responding with higher public spending
and lower taxes, as the Greek government has already done or has announed
to do, can make the recession milder (the output loss can be around 8.5%
in 2020) and the rise in public debt smaller (it could be around 214%). The
same simulations show that the expected financial assistance from the EU
via the Recovery Fund (around 32 billion euros for Greece) can seriously
help the Greek economy but this depends crucially on the way it is used. If
it is used, for example, to finance public investment, it will limit the output
loss to around 6.5% in 2020 and will also put the country on a sustaibale
path with public debt falling to around 168.5% in the coming years thanks
to economic growth. If, on the other hand, it becomes a common pool for
rent seeking, it will be completely wasted (it will be as if the country has
received zero aid from the EU) and the country will be trapped in a bad
equilibrium in the coming years. Product market liberalization and develop-
ments in institutional quality will also be crucial, as they have been during
the debt crisis in the 2010s.
Related literature and how we differ As already mentioned, there
has been a rich literature on the Greek debt crisis. Papers close to ours,
which have also used micro-founded macroeconomic models, include Arel-
lano and Bai (2016), Gourinchas et al. (2017), Papageorgiou and Vour-
vachaki (2017), Economides et al. (2017), Glomm et al. (2018), Dellas et
al. (2018) and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2019). A common finding of most
of these papers, which is also a result shared by our work, is that roughly
half of the loss in output between 2008 and 2016 is explained by the fiscal
austeriry package adopted.
Our work enriches this literature along several dimensions. One key
difference is the way we model economic policy. Here, we take a more bal-
anced view by taking into account, not only the costs of fiscal austerity as
the above papers have done, but also the role, and the potential benefits,
of international financial assistance, where the latter has been both fiscal
(fiscal bailouts) and monetary (ECB support) as well as both explicit (e.g.
offi cial rescue programs) and implicit (e.g. TARGET2 liabilities). We do so
because one cannot study fiscal austerity without taking into account the
other side of the coin which is international financial assistance; as said,
the former was the precondition for the latter in the economic adjustment
program agreed between Greece and its creditors. We also study the role
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of the deterioration in institutional quality that occured at the same time
and has been triggered by the fiscal austerity measures (and further fuelled
by populism from several political sides). Another difference is that several
of the above papers, especially Gourinchas et al. (2017), Economides et al.
(2017) and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2019), employ a large menu of shocks to
explain the crisis, including shocks to TFP, to interest rates on public debt,
to default rates, to banks’ funding costs, etc. Here, by contrast, most of
these variables are endogenously determined. In our paper, when we study
the debt crisis, there are two driving forces only (the time-paths of the eco-
nomic adjustment program and an index of institutional quality, both as
recorded in the data), and then the propagation mechanisms of our model
provide the channels through which these two driving forces shape macro-
economic and distributional outcomes. For example, to the extent that weak
property rights distort private incentives leading to resource misallocation,
this distortion shows up as an adverse productivity shock endogenizing the
TFP.4
Putting all this together, despite a lively debate on the role of financial
assistance and institutional quality in policy circles, there have not been
theoretical general equilibrium models tailored to study these issues in a
unified framework; our paper fills this gap by developing such a model and
uses it to quantitatively evaluate their effects. Finally, in terms of findings,
we add some new results to those of the literature. For example, we show
what would have happened without financial aid from the EU and ECB.
We also show that the resource misallocation and output loss, caused by the
further deterioration of property rights and the fear of predation since the
end of 2008, are particularly large.
But our work is more than a country study. We also contribute to the
literature on the nexus among fiscal, public finance and balance-sheet, or
quantitative, monetary policies. And we do so in the context of an open
economy being a member of a currency union like the EZ. Most of the
related papers, reviewed in subsection 2.6 below, have studied this debated
nexus in the context of a closed economy, mainly the US. On the other hand,
the models used by the ECB have focused on the link between private banks
and the ECB staying away from fiscal financing needs (see e.g. Coenen et al.
(2018)). Here, by contrast, building on this literature, as well as on the work
of Reis (2013, 2017) and Sinn (2014), we study how balance sheet monetary
policies can affect fiscal and country resources in a model that exhibits the
4The TFP measures the effi ciency with which resources are used in production (see
e.g. Prescott (2002) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2013)). As is widely acknowledged,
differences in TFP are an important factor in accounting for differences in incomes across
countries (see e.g. Prescott (2002)). But it is also acknowledged that TFP is endogenous
at macro level being determined, for instance, by tax policies and institutions that shape
the risks of expropriation. In our model, weak institutions lead to resource misallocation
and this determines the "effective" TFP.
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key features of the Eurosystem. We show that the role of the ECB in the
Greek debt crisis was vital.
Layout The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is
in section 2. Parameterization, data and the solution for the year 2008
are in section 3. Departing from this solution, section 4 presents positive
results over 2008-2019, while counterfactuals are in section 5. Section 6
models the recent covid-19 pandemic and its economic impact on the Greek
macroeconomy. Section 7 closes the paper. An appendix contains algebraic
details; this appendix is separately submitted.
2 A macroeconomic model for Greece
In this section, we construct a micro-founded macroeconomic model for the
Greek economy during the euro period. We start with an informal descrip-
tion of the model.
2.1 Informal description of the model
Although we cannot include all details and capture the complexity of real-
ity as sketched in the previous section and further discussed in subsection
3.2 below, we will at least try to construct a model that embeds the key
features of the Greek economy. To do so, we add a number of frictions to a
standard small open economy model. These frictions are of two categories.
The first category includes real and nominal frictions commonly used by the
quantitative macroeconomic literature (see e.g. Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe
(2017)). The second category includes Greek-specific features. The com-
monly used frictions include various types of adjustment costs, debt-elastic
interest rates when the country borrows from abroad, imperfect competi-
tion, nominal rigidities, etc. The Greek-specific features include a relatively
detailed public sector, problems of institutional quality and, since the be-
ginning of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009, international financial assistance
combined with fiscal austerity.
In what follows, we briefly introduce the building blocks of the model.
Households There are three distinct types of households, called capital
owners, workers and public employees.5 Capital owners are the economy’s
stockholders; they own private firms and banks, receive their profits and
participate in the international financial market.6 Private workers work in
private firms. Public employees work in state firms. Both workers and public
employees can keep deposits at private banks acting as savers. All types of
households consume a domestic and a foreign imported good, receive income
5Typically, some type of agent heterogeneity is necessary if we want to have savers and
borrowers and different interest rates in equilbrium (see below for references and details).
This will also allow us to study distributional implications.
6See e.g. Lansing (2015) for concentrated capital ownership of this type.
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from different types of work, hold currency and are engaged in rent-seeking
activities (the latter are discussed below). The three types of households
are modeled in subsection 2.2.
Private firms The domestic final good is produced by final good firms
that act competitively using differentiated intermediate goods. The lat-
ter are produced by intermediate goods firms which act monopolistically à
la Dixit-Stiglitz and face nominal rigidities à la Rotemberg. Intermediate
goods firms choose labor, capital and imported goods and also make use
of productivity-enhancing public goods/services that enter the private pro-
duction function as an externality. They finance their capital accumulation
by retained earnings, by issuance of shares, which are bought by capital
owners, and by loans from private banks. There are also capital good firms
that produce the capital demanded by intermediate goods firms. Any prof-
its generated by private firms are distributed to capital owners. Firms are
modeled in subsection 2.3.
Private banks On the asset side, private banks make loans to private
firms and purchase government bonds. On the side of liabilities, they receive
deposits from savers and loans from the national central bank. To model
the profit-maximizing behavior of private banks, and also account for the
possibility that borrowing and lending takes place in equilibrium, we adopt
the framework introduced by Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011) and in turn
used by Corsetti et al. (2013) and many others.7 Within this framework,
the difference between deposit and lending interest rate emerges as a result
of heterogeneity in patience between savers (workers and public employees)
and borrowers (firms or, equivalently their owners, capital owners) as well
as of costly financial intermediation. Any profits generated by private banks
are distributed to capital owners. Banks are modeled in subsection 2.4.
State firms State firms use public employees, goods purchased from the
private sector and public capital (the latter is augmented by public invest-
ment spending) to produce a public good that provides utility-enhancing
services to households and productivity-enhancing services to firms, where
the associated spending inputs as shares of GDP, as well as the fraction of
public employees in population, will be set as in the data. State firms are
in subsection 2.5.
National central bank (NCB) in the Eurosystem (ES) On the
side of assets, the NCB makes loans to private banks and can also hold
government bonds. On the liabilities side, the monetary base consists of
banknotes and cross-border TARGET2 liabilities (these are the two largest
liability items in the Greek data; by contrast, reserves held by private banks
at the Greek NCB are small in magnitude and so are assumed away). In
7The model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) is another
popular model in this literature. We do not believe the particular model of the banking
sector is important to our results. We use the Curdia-Woodford model for its relative
simplicity. Walsh (2017, chapter 11) reviews this literature.
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other words, the NCB’s spending is financed by printing new banknotes
held by private agents and by issuing TARGET2 liabilities to other NCB’s
according to the rules of the ES. Any portfolio profits generated by the NCB
are transferred to its government in the form of a lump-sum dividend. The
NCB is modeled in subsection 2.6.3.
Treasury or the government On the revenue side, the Treasury, or
the government, taxes income and consumption, receives a dividend from its
NCB and/or from the ECB and issues sovereign bonds. The latter can be
purchased by domestic investors (domestic private banks and the national
central bank) and by foreign investors (where foreign investors can be both
private and public like EU institutions and the ECB). On the expenditure
side, the Treasury spends on wages of public employees, government invest-
ment, government purchases of goods from the private sector, as well as
transfer payments to households. This is in subsection 2.6.2.
Macroeconomic policy regime We assume that, during the years of
the Greek sovereign debt crisis, monetary policy was shaped by the public
and banking financing needs of the country. Specifically, we assume that,
during these years, the ECB followed an accommodative policy towards
Greece, in the sense that quantitative monetary policies, and in particular
the issuance of TARGET2 liabilities to the ES, were adjusted so as to ensure
that Greece’s consolidated government budget constraint was satisfied in
each period, while the tax-spending-public debt mix (including the offi cial
fiscal bailouts) is set as in the data. This is analysed in subsection 2.6.5.
Stationarity in a small open economy As is known, we need an
“imperfection”to get a stationary solution in a small-open economy model.
Popular devices include a debt-elastic interest rate when agents borrow from
abroad, or a transaction cost again when agents borrow from abroad, or an
endogenous time preference rate (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)).
Here, to bring the dynamics of the model closer to the data, we will assume
both a debt-elastic country interest rate and transaction costs, although one
is enough to guarantee stationarity. The country debt-elastic interest rate
is in subsection 2.8, while transaction costs associated with borrowing from
private foreign markets are in subsections 2.2.1 and 2.6.2.
Institutions As said above, in most situations, poor institutions show
up in ill-defined property rights and the most common way of modeling
the latter has been to assume that private and/or communal properties
become "common pools".8 Then, access to a common pool distorts indi-
vidual incentives to work or save and this leads to resource misallocation
and poor macroeconomic performance. Here, we will assume that, because
of weak property rights, producers can appropriate only a fraction of their
8See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14), Drazen (2000, chapters 8 and 10),
Hillman (2009, chapter 2), Besley and Ghatak (2010), Grossman (2001) and Acemoglu
and Robinson (2019) for common-pool problems, weak property rights and extraction.
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output, while the rest can be taken away by rent seekers, where the latter
are assumed to be all types of households who compete with each other for
a fraction of the contestable prize in a Tullock-type redistributive contest.
Our measure of the degree of property rights will be set as in the data, while
the rent-seeking technology is specified in subsections 2.2 and 2.3.2.
Modelling details will be provided as we present each building block of
the above described model.
Two early remarks Before we proceed, we wish to make two early
remarks about the model. First, by assuming market-clearing in the labor
market(s), any fall in output is obviously reflected in a fall in hours of
work rather than in unemployed people. This is for simplicity. We have
experimented with an extended version of our model that allows for both
less hours of work and less employed people whenever output happens to
fall. In particular, we have implemented this by replacing the supply of labor
function with a wage rigidity rule as in e.g. Blanchard and Gali (2007), and
where any decrease in the demand for labor on the part of firms is divided
between a decrease in work hours and a decrease in the number of working
people as in Ball and Romer (1990). Since the main results are not affected
by this extension, we present the version of the model without unemployed
people. Second, we will not model explicitly the fear of being forced out of
the eurozone (what has been known as the fear of Grexit). Nevertheless,
most indices of institutional quality are based on both observable data and
perceptions; the index for the enforcement of property rights used in our
paper is not an exception. In other words, this index reflects both hard
data and perceptions/sentiments, and the latter can incorporate the fear of
Grexit affecting (among other things) private sector’s expectations about
future factor returns and economic policies. Besides, in the data, measures
of core institutional fundamentals (like the rule of law, etc) are strongly
correlated with measures of country risk (like the International Country
Risk Guide, ICRG).9 In any case, we will return to this point in the last
concluding section.
2.2 Households
There are three distinct types of households, called capital owners, workers
and public employees. Capital owners are indexed by the subscript k =
1, 2, ..., Nk, workers by the subscript w = 1, 2, ...Nw, and public employees
by the subscript b = 1, 2, ..., N b. That is, the total population is N = Nk +
Nw + N b. Equivalently, in terms of population ratios, we define nk ≡ NkN ,
nw ≡ NwN and n
b ≡ NbN = 1− n
k − nw. For simplicity, total population and
its decomposition to the three groups is exogenous and kept constant over
time; we also assume away occupational mobility from one group to another.
9See e.g. Christou et al. (2020) for a number of Eurozone countries including Greece.
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2.2.1 Households as capital owners
There are k = 1, 2, ..., Nk identical capital owners. These households own the
firms and banks and receive their profits. They also have the opportunity to
participate in the international asset market. Besides, like all other types of
households, they receive income from work, hold currency and are engaged
in rent-seeking activities.
Each k maximizes discounted lifetime utility:
∞∑
t=0
(βk)
tu (ck,t, uk,thk,t; y
g
t ) (1)
where ck,t, uk,t and hk,t denote respectively k’s consumption, leisure time and
end-of-period currency (in real terms),10 ygt denotes the per capita quantity
of public goods/services provided and produced by the government, and
0 < βk < 1 is capital owners’time discount factor.
For our numerical solutions, we will use the utility function:
u (ck,t, uk,t, hk,t; y
g
t ) = µ1 log ck,t + µ2 log uk,t + µ3 log hk,t + µ4 log y
g
t
where 0 < µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 < 1 are preference parameters with µ1+ µ2+
µ3 + µ4 = 1.
Since there are two goods, home and foreign, we define the consumption
index:
ck,t =
(chk,t)
ν(cfk,t)
1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (2)
where chk,t and c
f
k,t denote k’s domestic and foreign consumption respectively
and 0 < ν < 1 measures the weight given to the domestic good relative to
the foreign good.
The time constraint of each k in each period is:
lk,t + sk,t + uk,t = 1 (3a)
where lk,t and sk,t are respectively k’s effort time allocated to productive
work and anti-social or rent seeking activities.
The within-period budget constraint of each k written in real terms is:
(1 + τ ct )
(
pht
pt
chk,t +
pft
pt
cfk,t
)
+ (1 + i∗t )
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
fk,t−1+
+qtRk,t +
pht
pt
ψp(.) + hk,t ≡
10To give currency a role, we use a money-in-the-utility-function model. Alternatively,
we could use a cash-in-advance model. This is not important to our results.
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≡ (1− τyt )wkt lk,t + (qt + πik,t)Rk,t−1 + π
p
k,t
+
etp
∗
t
pt
fk,t +
pt−1
pt
hk,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γk(sk,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt (3b)
where pht is the price of the domestic good, p
f
t is the price of the foreign good
expressed in domestic currency, pt is the country’s CPI specified below, p∗t
is the CPI abroad, et is the nominal exchange rate (an increase means a
depreciation), fk,t is the real value of one-period foreign debt denominated
in foreign prices and acquired by each k at t on which k pays the country-
specific nominal interest rate i∗t+1 at t + 1 (if k is a lender, fk,t < 0 and
i∗t+1 denotes a return),
11 Rk,t denotes the number of firms’shares purchased
by each k at time t at a price qt, wkt is the real wage rate paid to capital
owners, πik,t stands for the share’s dividend paid to each k by private firms
net of taxes, πpk,t is the profit generated by private banks and paid to each
k net of taxes, hk,t is the real value of currency carried over from t to t+ 1,
ψp(.) is a transaction cost function associated with the agent’s participation
in the foreign capital market (defined below), gtr is a uniform transfer from
the government and 0 ≤ τ ct , τ
y
t < 1 are the tax rates on final consumption
goods and income.
The last term on the RHS of (3b) is the amount extracted by each k from
the common pool. Given weak property rights, we assume that total real
output, defined as Yt,12 is a common pool or a contestable prize, so that only
a fraction of it, PRtYt, remains in the hands of its producers because the rest,
(1−PRt)Yt, is taken away by rent seekers, where the rents extracted by each
person depend on the anti-social activities employed by him/her relative to
total anti-social activities.13 That is, 0 < PRt ≤ 1 is the degree of protection
of property rights and the term
(
Γk(sk,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ+NwΓw(sw,t)γ+NbΓb(sb,t)γ
)
is the
fraction of the common pool extracted by each k in a Tullock (1980) type
rent-seeking competition. Regarding the rent-seeking technology, as in e.g.
11This is denominated in foreign currency. That is, if Fk,t is the nominal value for each
agent k, the real value is fk,t ≡ Fk,tp∗t .
12As we shall see below, Yt ≡ N i p
h
t
pt
yhi,t, where N
i is the number of private firms and
yhi,t is the product of each of those firms.
13 Ill-defined property rights obviously hurt those who are productive and so reduce their
incentives to produce and invest (see below the firm’s problem), but there are social losses
on the side of predators as well, since the pursuit of a share of a contestable prize, where
contestability is made possible by weak property rights or ill-meant publicness, distorts
their own incentives and talents (see e.g. Murphy et al (1991), Hillman (2009, chapter 2),
Besley and Ghatak (2010), Esteban and Ray (2011) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2019)).
This is the case in our model with Tullock-type rent seeking competition. Quantitative
DSGE models with similar extraction technology include Angelopoulos et al. (2009) and
Christou et al. (2020).
12
Dixit (2004, chapter 5) and Hillman (2009, chapter 2), the power coeffcient,
γ, is between 0 and 1 and measures how quickly diminishing returns arise
in anti-social activities, while the parameter Γk measures the effi cacy of k’s
aggresion. Both are measures of the technology of fighting. If Γk increases
and/or γ decreases, agent k has a stronger incentive to devote effort time to
rent seeking. Note that this specification, specifically, the different values of
Γk, Γw and Γb, allows us to have asymmetries in equilibrium; namely, differ-
ent types of rent seekers can choose different allocations and receive different
wages even if they attack the same pie and share the same preferences.
Regarding the per agent cost associated with participation in the foreign
financial market, it is assumed to take the form:
ψp(.) ≡ 1
Nkt
ψp
2
 etp∗tpt (Nkt fk,t + F gt )
pht
pt
Yt
− f
2 Yt (4)
where ψp ≥ 0 is a transaction cost parameter associated with participation in
foreign capital markets, F gt denotes total public foreign debt (i.e. public debt
issued by the domestic government and held by foreign private investors)
denominated in foreign currency,14 Nkt fk,t denotes total private foreign debt
denominated in foreign currency, Yt is total real output and the parameter
f is a threshold value of the country’s foreign debt as share of GDP above
which such costs arise. In other words, the cost is increasing in the country’s
total real foreign debt to total real GDP.
Each k acts competitively choosing {chk,t, c
f
k,t, ck,t, lk,t, sk,t, Rk,t, fk,t,
hk,t}∞t=0 subject to the above. The first-order conditions are in Appendix
A.1 of the supplementary file.
2.2.2 Households as workers
There is a pool of w = 1, 2, ..., Nw identical households-workers. They are
employed by private firms (see below). Like all other households, work-
ers consume, work, hold currency and participate in rent-seeking activities.
Workers can also save in the form of bank deposits.15
Each worker w maximizes:
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cw,t, uw,t, hw,t; y
g
t ) (5)
where variables are defined as above in the capital owners’problem if we
replace the subscript k with the subscript w and 0 < β < 1 is workers’time
14For more details, see the government budget constraint below.
15The assumption that workers and public employees do not participate in all asset
markets is without loss of generality. We could assume that all households face transac-
tion costs that make costly their participation in asset markets but workers and public
employees face higher costs.
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discount factor. We will assume 0 < βk < β < 1, which will induce savers
(here, workers and public employees) to have bank deposits and borrowers
(here, firms) to take on debt in equilibrium.16
As above, we use the utility function:
u (cw,t, uw,t, hw,t; y
g
t ) = µ1 log cw,t + µ2 log uw,t + µ3 log hw,t + µ4 log y
g
t
and the consumption index:
cw,t =
(chw,t)
ν(cfw,t)
1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (6)
Also, as above, the maximization is subject to the time constraint:
lw,t + sw,t + uw,t = 1 (7a)
and the budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )
(
pht
pt
chw,t +
pft
pt
cfw,t
)
+ jw,t + hw,t ≡
≡ (1− τyt )wwt lw,t + (1 + idt )
pt−1
pt
jw,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hw,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γw(sw,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt (7b)
where wwt is the real wage rate of workers and jw,t is the real value of each w’s
bank deposits chosen at t and paying a nominal interest rate idt+1 at t + 1.
Notice that workers are assumed to have access to the same contestable
prize as all other agents. They also receive the same transfer paid by the
government to all other households.
Each w acts competitively choosing {chw,t, c
f
w,t, cw,t, lw,t, sw,t, jw,t, hw,t}∞t=0
subject to the above. The first-order conditions are in Appendix A.2 of the
supplementary file.
2.2.3 Households as public employees
There are b = 1, 2, ..., N b identical public employees. They are employed
by state firms (see below). Like all other households, public employees
consume, work, hold currency and are engaged in rent-seeking activities.
16See also e.g. Benigno et al. (2014), Korinek and Simsek (2016) and Philippopoulos et
al. (2017b) for permanent differences in discount factors between savers and borrowers.
Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011) also assume differences in the degree of impatience
among savers and borrowers although this difference does not remain fixed over time (this
is not important to our results). Also, in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and
Karadi (2011), bankers face a probability of exit, which effectively reduces their time
discount factor as in the perpetual youth model of Blanchard (1985).
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Also, like workers, they can save in the form of bank deposits. Variables
will be defined as above in the workers’problem if we replace the subscript
w with the subscript b.
Each b maximizes:
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cb,t, ub,t, hb,t; y
g
t ) (8)
As above, the ulility function and the consumption index are:
u (cb,t, 1− lb,t, hb,t; ygt ) = µ1 log cb,t + µ2 log ub,t + µ3 log hb,t + µ4 log y
g
t
cb,t =
(chb,t)
ν(cfb,t)
1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (9)
Also, as above, the maximization is subject to the time constraint:
lb,t + sb,t + ub,t = 1 (10a)
and the budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )
(
pht
pt
chb,t +
pft
pt
cfb,t
)
+ jb,t + hb,t ≡
≡ (1− τyt )w
g
t lb,t + (1 + i
d
t )
pt−1
pt
jb,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hb,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γb(sb,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt (10b)
where wgt is the real wage in the public sector while the rest of the variables
are defined as in the worker’s problem.
Each b acts competitively choosing {chb,t, c
f
b,t, cb,t, lb,t, sb,t, jb,t, hb,t}∞t=0
subject to the above.17 The first-order conditions are in Appendix A.3 of
the supplementary file.
2.3 Private firms and production of private goods
Private firms are owned by capital owners. Following most of the related
literature, there are three types of goods produced by three associated types
of firms. There is a single domestic final good produced by competitive final
good firms. There are also differentiated intermediate goods used as inputs
for the production of the final good. Each differentiated intermediate good is
produced by an intermediate goods firm that acts as a monopolist in its own
17The choice of lb,t can be thought as a choice of work effort. Allowing for a fixed shift,
or hours of work, in the public sector would not change our results to the extent that
public employees can still choose the effort they make while at work.
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product market à la Dixit-Stiglitz facing Rotemberg-type nominal fixities.
Finally, competitive capital good firms produce capital used as an input in
the production of intermediate goods. As in most of the related literature,
the essential role is played by intermediate goods firms.
2.3.1 Final good firms
There are Nh final good firms indexed by subscript h = 1, 2, ..., Nh. For
notational simplicity, we will set Nh = Nk, that is, the number of final good
firms equals the number of their owners. Each final good firm produces an
amount yhh,t by using intermediate goods according to the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz technology:
yhh,t =
 N i∑
i=1
1
N i
(yhi,t)
θ
 1θ (11)
where yhi,t denotes the quantity of intermediate good of variety i = 1, 2, ..., N
i
t
used by each final good firm h and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is a parameter measuring
the degree of substitutability (when θ = 1, intermediate goods are perfect
substitutes in the production of the final good and the intermediate goods
sector is perfectly competitive).
Each final-good producer chooses yhi,t to maximize real profits:
yhh,t −
N i∑
i=1
1
N i
phi,t
pht
yhi,t (12)
where pht is the price of the final good and p
h
i,t is the price of intermediate
good i.
The firm maximizes its profit acting competitively subject to the above.
The familiar first-order condition for inputs used is in Appendix A.4 of the
supplementary file.
2.3.2 Intermediate goods firms
There areN i intermediate goods firms indexed by the subscript i = 1, 2, ..., N i.
Since they are owned and managed by capital owners, we again set N i = Nk
for notational simplicity. These firms make investment and other factor de-
cisions facing capital and Rotemberg-type price adjustment costs. New in-
vestment is financed by retained earnings, by issuing shares and by obtaining
loans from private banks.18
18We will work similarly to e.g. Miao (2014, chapter 14) and Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe
(2017, chapter 4). Our modelling also follows e.g. Brock and Turnovsky (1981), Altug
and Labadie (1994, chapter 4) and Turnovsky (1995, chapter 11), although these papers
solve a more general corporate finance problem (see below).
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The gross profit of each intermediate goods firm i, denoted as πgrossi,t , is
defined as sales minus the wage bill minus the cost of imported goods minus
adjustment costs associated with changes in capital and prices:
πgrossi,t ≡ PRt
phi,t
pt
yhi,t − wwt lwi,t − wkt lki,t −
pft
pt
mfi,t−
−p
h
t
pt
ξk
2
(
ki,t
ki,t−1
− 1
)2
ki,t−1 −
pht
pt
ξp
2
(
phi,t
phi,t−1
− 1
)2
yhi,t (13a)
where lwi,t is labor services provided by workers and used by firm i, l
k
i,t is
labor services provided by capital owners and used by i, mfi,t is imported
goods used by each i, ki,t is capital goods purchased from capital good pro-
ducers by each i in the current period and used in the next period (as we
shall see below, the relative price of capital is 1), ξk is a parameter mea-
suring standard capital adjustment costs and ξp is a parameter measuring
Rotemberg-type price adjustment costs.19 Finally, as said above, firms can
appropriate only a fraction, 0 < PRt ≤ 1, of their output because of poor
institutional quality.
This gross profit is held as retained earnings and is also used for the
payment of corporate taxes to the government, dividends to shareholders
and interest payments for loans received from private banks:
πgrossi,t ≡ REi,t + τ
π
t
(
PRt
phi,t
pt
yhi,t − wwt lwi,t − wkt lki,t −
pft
pt
mfi,t
)
+
+πi,tRi,t−1 + i
l
t
pt−1
pt
Li,t−1 (13b)
where REi,t is retained earnings, 0 ≤ τπt < 1 a tax rate, πi,t is the dividend
paid to shareholders for each share, Ri,t−1 is the beginning-of-period number
of shares and Li,t−1 denotes the inherited bank loan on which the firm pays
a nominal interest rate, ilt.
Purchases of new capital, i.e. investment, are financed by retained earn-
ings, issuance of new shares and a new loan from private banks:
pht
pt
[ki,t − (1− δ)ki,t−1] ≡ REi,t+(Ri,t−Ri,t−1)qt+(Li,t−
pt−1
pt
Li,t−1) (13c)
where qt is the relative price of shares (see also the capital owners’budget
constraint above).
19Notice that Rotemberg-type costs associated with price changes are assumed to be
proportional to average output, yhi,t, which is taken as given by each i. This proportionality
is not important but helps the smooth dynamics of the model.
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Combining the above constraints, we get:
(1− τπt )
[
PRt
phi,t
pt
yhi,t − wwt lwi,t − wkt lki,t −
pft
pt
mfi,t
]
−
−p
h
t
pt
[ki,t − (1− δ)ki,t−1]−
−p
h
t
pt
ξk
2
(
ki,t
ki,t−1
− 1
)2
kk,t−1 −
pht
pt
ξp
2
(
phi,t
phi,t−1
− 1
)2
yhi,t ≡
≡ πi,tRi,t−1 − (Ri,t −Ri,t−1)qt −
(
Li,t − (1 + ilt)
pt−1
pt
Li,t−1
)
(13d)
where the left-hand side is the net cash flow of the firm.
Setting the number of shares at one, Ri,t ≡ 1 at any t, the firm’s dividend
or net profit, πi,t, simplifies to:20
πi,t ≡ (1− τπt )
[
PRt
phi,t
pt
yhi,t − wwt lwi,t − wkt lki,t −
pft
pt
mfi,t
]
−
−p
h
t
pt
[ki,t − (1− δ)ki,t−1]−
pht
pt
ξk
2
(
ki,t
ki,t−1
− 1
)2
kk,t−1−
−p
h
t
pt
ξp
2
(
phi,t
phi,t−1
− 1
)2
yhi,t+
+
(
Li,t − (1 + ilt)
pt−1
pt
Li,t−1
)
(14)
For the firm’s production function, we adopt the form:
yhi,t = A
p
(
Ngygg,t
N i
)σ [(
χp(ki,t−1)
op + (1− χp)(mfi,t)
op
) α
op
(
Awlwi,t +A
klki,t
)1−α]1−σ
(15)
where the parameter 0 ≤ χp ≤ 1 measures the intensity of capital, ki,t−1,
relative to goods imported from abroad, mfi,t, the parameter op > 0 mea-
sures the degree of substitutability between capital and imported goods, the
coeffi cient 1 − a gives the share of labor inputs used by the firm, the para-
meters Aw and Ak measure the relative productivity of workers and capital
owners respectively, Ap > 0 is TFP in the private sector and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 is
the contribution of public goods/services per firm to private production.
20This is as in e.g. Miao (2014, chapter 14) and Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017, chapter
4). Imposing this market-clearing condition ex ante makes the problem of the firm simpler.
Otherwise, see e.g. Brock and Turnovsky (1981), Altug and Labadie (1994, chapter 4)
and Turnovsky (1995, chapter 11).
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Firms are assumed to be subject to a borrowing constraint.21 Following
most of the related literature (see e.g. Garin (2015), Guntner (2015), etc),
we assume that firms can borrow up to a fraction of their capital:
Li,t ≤ ρl
pht
pt
ki,t−1 (16)
where the parameter ρl ≥ 0 measures the tightness of borrowing conditions.
Therefore, each firm i maximizes the discounted sum of dividends dis-
tributed to its owners: ∞∑
t=0
(βi,t)
tπi,t (17)
where, since firms are owned by capital owners, we will ex post postulate
that the firm’s discount factor, βi,t, equals the capitall owners’marginal rate
of substitution between consumption at t and t+ 1, βi,t ≡ βk(1+τ
c
t )ck,t
(1+τct+1)ck,t+1
.22
The firm chooses {lwi,t, lki,t, m
f
i,t, ki,t, Li,t}∞t=0 to maximize its stream of
dividends or net profits, as defined in (14) and (17), subject to the pro-
duction function in (15), the borrowing constraint in (16) and the inverse
demand function for its product coming from the final good firm’s prob-
lem. Details and the firm’s first-order conditions are in Appendix A.5 of the
supplementary file.
2.3.3 Capital good firms
There are N c capital good firms indexed by the subscript c = 1, 2, ..., N c.
Since they are owned by capital owners, we again set N c = Nk for notational
simplicity. Working similarly to e.g. Guntner (2015), Uribe and Schmitt-
Grohe (2017, pp. 79 and 110), and many others, we assume that capital good
producers aquire the depreciated capital stock, choose investment activity
and sell the latter to intermediate goods firms. Here, this problem is modeled
in the simplest possible way by assuming away adjustment costs, so that, in
each period, each firm c maximizes its profit given by:
πc,t ≡ Qtxc,t − xc,t (18)
where xc,t is the amount of investment produced and Qt is the relative price
of capital also known as Tobin’s q. Here, without capital adjustment costs,
the first-order condition is simply Qt = 1 as assumed above. Also, the profit
is zero in equilibrium.
21We could assume different types of constraints as in e.g. Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe
(2017) and Sims and Wu (2020). We do not believe this is important to our results.
22See also e.g. Altug and Labadie (1994, pp. 165-6), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and
Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017, pp. 110-111).
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2.4 Private banks
There are Np private banks indexed by the subscript p = 1, 2, ..., Np. Since
they are owned and managed by capital owners, we again set Np = Nk
for notational simplicity. In addition to their standard role, which is the
provision of intermediation between lenders and borrowers by converting
bank deposits into loans to firms, we also allow private banks to receive
loans from the NCB and to purchase government bonds. Therefore, on the
side of liabilities, private banks receive deposits from households and take
loans from the NCB, while, on the asset side, they make loans to private
firms and purchase government bonds. As said above, we do not include
reserves held by private banks at the NCB; this is simply because they are
small in the Greek data (for financial statements of the Bank of Greece, see
subsection 3.2 below). Any profits made by banks are distributed to their
owners, namely the entrepreneurs.
The budget constraint of each p that connects changes in its assets and
liabilities is (written in real and per capita terms):
Lp,t + bp,t + πp,t + (1 + i
d
t )
pt−1
pt
jp,t−1+
+
pht
pt
Ξ(Lp,t, zp,t, bp,t) + (1 + i
z
t )
pt−1
pt
zp,t−1 ≡
≡ (1 + ilt)
pt−1
pt
Lp,t−1 + (1 + i
∗
t )
pt−1
pt
bp,t−1 + jp,t + zp,t (19)
where Lp,t is loans given to firms on which banks receive the nominal interest
rate ilt+1 one period later, bp,t is one-period government bonds purchased by
banks at t on which banks receive the country-specific nominal interest rate
i∗t+1 one period later, πp,t is bank p’s profits distributed to bank owners in
a lump-sum fashion, jp,t is bank deposits on which banks pay the nominal
interest rate idt+1 one period later, zp,t is loans from the NCB to the private
bank on which private banks pay the nominal policy interest rate izt+1 one
period later and Ξ(Lp,t, zp,t, bp,t) is real operational costs faced by banks that
are assumed to be increasing in the volume of loans given to firms, increasing
in the volume of loans taken from the NCB and decreasing in holdings of
government bonds (the latter captures the idea that government bonds are
used as a collateral for taking loans from the NCB). In what folows, we will
use the functional form Ξ(Lp,t, bp,t) =
ξl
2 (Lp,t)
2 + ξ
z
2 (zp,t)
2 + ξ
b
2 (bp,t)
−2 which
can give well-defined demand and supply functions.23
Loans from the NCB to private banks are assumed to be subject to a
borrowing constraint. Similarly to the firm’s problem above, we assume that
each private bank can borrow up to a fraction of its assets:
zp,t ≤ ρz(Lp,t + bp,t) (20)
23 In Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011), the banks intermediate between borrowers and
lenders and the associated intermediation cost falls with reserves held at the central bank.
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where the parameter ρz ≥ 0 measures teh tightness of borrowing conditions.
The bank’s profit maximization problem subject to the above is solved
as in Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011) and Corsetti et al (2013). Modeling
details and first-order conditions for the supply of loans to firms, Lp,t, and
the demand for credit from the NCB, zp,t, in each period, are in Appendix
A.6 of the supplementary file. Notice that we can also derive optimally
the demand for government bonds, bp,t. However, instead of choosing bp,t
optimally, we prefer to simply set it (namely, the fraction of Greek public
debt purchased by private domestic banks) exogenously as in the data. This
helps us to bring the model closer to the data and can be justified by the
fact that, in Greece, there is a nexus of public-finance policy and private
banks (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Reis (2019) for this nexus in EZ periphery
countries).
2.5 State firms and production of public goods/services
We now model the way in which state enterprises produce the publicly pro-
vided good/service. There are Ng state firms indexed by the subscript
g = 1, 2, ..., Ng producing a single public good/service. For notational sim-
plicity, we will set Ng = N b, that is, the number of state firms equals the
number of public employees.
The cost of each state firm g for producing the public good is in real
terms:
wgt lg,t +
pht
pt
(ggg,t + g
i
g,t) +
pft
pt
mgg,t (21)
where lg,t is labor services used by each state firm g, g
g
g,t is goods purchased
from the private sector by each g, gig,t is investment made by each g, and
mgg,t is imported goods used by each g.
The production function of each state firm g is assumed to be similar to
that in the private sector:
ygg,t = A
g
(
χg(kgg,t−1)
og + (1− χg)(mgg,t)og
) θ1
og
(lg,t)
θ2
(
ggg,t
)1−θ1−θ2 (22)
where 0 ≤ χg ≤ 1 measures the intensity of public capital, kgg,t−1, relative
to goods imported from abroad, mgg,t, the parameter og > 0 measures the
degree of substitutability between public capital and imported goods, the
coeffi cients 0 < θ1, θ2, 1− θ1 − θ2 < 1 measure the shares of the associated
factors in production and Ag > 0 is TFP in the public sector.
The stock of each state firm’s capital evolves over time as:
kgg,t = (1− δg)k
g
g,t−1 + g
i
g,t (23)
where 0 < δg < 1 is the depreciation rate of public capital.
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To specify the level of output produced by each state firm, ygg,t, and
hence the total amount of public goods/services provided to the society, we
obviously have to specify the amounts of inputs, lg,t, g
g
g,t, m
g
g,t and k
g
g,t (or
equivalently gig,t). Except from work hours or effort which is determined
by public employees (see their problem above), we will consider the case in
which the values of these inputs are as implied by the actual data, meaning
that the total number of public employees as a share of population, as well
as the associated government expenditures (on public investment, public
wages, goods purchased from the private sector and imported goods) as
shares of GDP, are set as in the data. Specifically, we define gig,t =
sitn
kyhi,t
nb
,
ggg,t =
sgtn
kyhi,t
nb
, mgg,t =
pht
pft
smt n
kyhi,t
nb
and wgt =
swt
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
nblb,t
, where nb ≡ NbN is
the fraction of public employees in population and sit, s
g
t , s
m
t and s
w
t are
respectively the GDP shares of government expenditures on investment,
goods purchased from the private sector, imported goods and public wages;
these values will be set according to the data (see subsection 3.2 below).
2.6 Fiscal and monetary policy
This section models separately the Treasury and the National Central Bank
(NCB) participating in the Eurosystem (ES). This is as in e.g. Reis (2013,
2017), Bassetto and Messer (2013), Woodford (2016), Benigno and Nistico
(2017) and Sims and Wu (2020) and can help us to understand the menu of
fiscal and monetary policy instruments available to policymakers and how
these instruments interact with each other. But, before we formalize things
in subsections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3, it is necessary to put our work in the context
of the literature on the nexus between fiscal, public finance and quantitative
monetary policies in subsection 2.6.1.
2.6.1 On the nexus between fiscal, public finance and quantita-
tive monetary policies
The literature on this nexus, departing from the benchmark model of Wal-
lace (1981), has focused on three important questions: first, the role of the
central bank as a fiscal actor and, specifically, what happens to the central
bank when it attempts to alleviate fiscal burdens; second, the associated
direct or indirect benefits for the government; third, the impact on the real
economic activity (see e.g. Reis (2013, 2017), Benigno and Nistiko (2017),
Sims and Wu (2020) and Blanchard and Pisani-Ferry (2020), while a rich
review is in Walsh (2017, chapter 11.5)).
It is convenient to start with monetary policy. It used to be customary in
macroeconomic models, especially between the 1970s and the global financial
crisis of 2008, to focus on conventional monetary policy (a nominal policy
interest rate, the nominal quantity of a monetary aggregate and the nominal
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exchange rate, which are dependent to each other) leaving aside balance
sheet, or quantitative, policies which have to do with the total size of the
central bank’s balance sheet and the mix of assets and liabilities that the
central holds (see Walsh (2017), section 11.5)). Related to this approach,
it also used to be customary to lump the budget constraint of the Treasury
and the budget constraint of the central bank into a single constraint, the
so-called budget constraint of the consolidated public sector. As has been
explained by e.g. Walsh (2017, chapter 11), Reis (2017) and Benigno and
Nistico (2017), the origin of this tradition dates back to the baseline model
of Wallace (1981) in which the size and mix of central bank’s balance sheet
does not affect the economy’s real allocation. Besides, within this baseline
model, regarding the ability of the central bank to alleviate fiscal burdens,
resources from the central bank to the fiscal authorities either do not exist
at all in equilibrium (as Reis (2017) puts it, when the central bank issues
money to buy government bonds, one type of liability replaces another) or,
when they exist, as it happens with seigniorage revenue, their real value
is small in magnitude (see Sibert (2012) and Reis (2017)), although, it is
worth clarifying here, that this presupposes that higher money growth is
accompanied by higher inflation which is not always the case in the data.
However, the massive expansion in central bank balance sheets since
the onset of the 2007-8 financial global crisis has forced a re-examination
of the nexus between monetary, fiscal and public finance policies. Leaving
aside conventional monetary policy instruments (whose independent use is
reduced, or fully lost, in a small open economy with fixed exchange rates
or in a currency union), balance sheet policies have been key elements of
monetary policy around the world since 2007-8. All major central banks
embarked on large-scale asset purchases (mainly in the form of government
debt) and loans, and this has been financed by creation of money on the
liability side of their balance sheets.24 The ECB has not been an exception
to this; the size of its balance sheet has increased by more than 200% between
2007 and 2019.25
As a response to these massive quantitative policies, the academic lit-
erature has added various financial frictions to the benchmark framework
that result in departures from Wallace’s neutrality property. Examples of
such frictions that lead to asset pricing wedges include transaction costs,
borrowing constraints, market segmentation, limited market participation,
24Historically, quantitative policies have always been key elements of standard monetary
policy. It is only since the 1970s, that such policies have been regarded as unconventional.
The 2007-8 crisis has simply forced a re-examination of this. See e.g. the papers presented
in the workshop on "Threat of Fiscal Dominance?" organised by the Bank for International
Settlements and the OECD in 2012 (BIS/OECD, 2012). See also the critical views in
Ryan-Collins (2015).
25The assets (and hence the liabilities too) of the ECB were around 1,508,000 million
euros in the end of 2007 and around 4,673,000 by the end of 2019 (see "Annual consolidated
balance sheet of the ES" available at the ECB’s site).
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moral hazard, non-rational expectations, etc (see Walsh (2017, chapter 11)
and Benigno and Nistico (2017) for reviews). Once we allow for such fric-
tions, quantitative monetary policies can have fiscal implications and also
affect the real economic activity.26
On top of this, as e.g. Sinn and Wollmershauser (2012), Sinn (2014) and
Reis (2013, 2017) have pointed out, in a currency union like the ES, there can
be extra routes through which quantitative monetary policies can alleviate
fiscal burdens and relax national constraints even in the absence of financial
frictions like the above. The currency union’s central bank, like the ECB
in the ES, can play a redistributive role by relaxing the fiscal and resource
constraints of some regions and by tightening those of others. Specifically,
Reis (2017, section 10) has argued that several of the ECB’s policies (like
the SMP, the provision of ELA and the way ECB’s dividends are distributed
to member-countries of the EZ) can belong to this category allowing for
redistribution of real resources among governments and nations within the
ES. A parallel literature (Sinn and Wollmershauser (2012) and Sinn (2014))
has argued that the issuance of TARGET2 balances can work in the same
redistributive way (TARGET2 balances, which are particularly large in the
case of Greece, are discussed and modeled below). Here, we will use a formal
criterion that helps us to judge whether a quantitative, or balance-sheet,
monetary policy can play a direct allocative role: it can, if, once market-
clearing conditions have been taken into account, this policy instrument
remains as an item in the economy’s resource constraint meaning its balance
of payments. According to this criterion, as we shall see below, purchases of
government bonds by the ES beyond those purchased by the NCB, dividends
given by the ES to the national government again beyond those transferred
by its NCB, as well as the issuance of TARGET2 liabililities by the NCB as
part of its monetary base, can, at least in principle, play an allocative role
and practically work like foreign public assistance that can replace private
capital inflows from abroad as has been argued by Sinn (2014).
The rest of this subsection will embed the above facts in our model for
the Greek economy. As said, the government will be separated into its two
agencies, fiscal and monetary.
2.6.2 The Treasury (fiscal authorities)
The Treasury, or the fiscal branch of government, uses revenues from taxes on
labor income, capital income and consumption, the issuance of government
bonds and a direct receipt/dividend from the central bank to finance its
various spending activities. This is standard; we will only differ in who can
hold Greek public debt so as to embed the offi cial fiscal bail out.
26Note that the Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011) setup, also adopted here, is one out
of several setups allowing for such a deviation from Wallace’s benchmark case.
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Public debt and its holders Let us define the real and per capita
public debt at the end of period t as dt. We assume that it can be held by
four different types of creditors: domestic private agents/banks, the NCB in
the ES,27 foreign private agents/banks and foreign public institutions; the
latter include EU institutions, like the ESM and other euro states, which
will be labeled as “EU”.28 In the pre-crisis period (2001-2008), the public
debt was mainly held by private (domestic and foreign) agents/banks, while
during the years of the debt crisis most of the Greek public debt has changed
hands and is now being held by the “EU”as part of Greece’s various bailout
programs (see subsection 3.2 below for data).
In particular, dt is decomposed to:
dt ≡ bdt + bncbt +
etp
∗
t
pt
fgt +
etp
∗
t
pt
feut (24a)
27We allow for government bond purchases by the NCB or the ECB for comparison to
the literature (actually, most of government bond purchases are carried out by the NCBs
rather than by the ECB itself; see e.g. Sinn (2014, chapter 8)). In the baseline numerical
solutions below, we will set the fraction of Greek public debt owned by the NCB or the
ECB at zero. This is for various reasons. For instance, these purchases are subject to
the shares of NCBs in the ECB capital (this is the so-called capital key based on the
population and size of the economy in each member country). In addition, NCBs and the
ECB can purchase member-countries’ government bonds in the secondary market only
(see e.g. the early asset purchase programs like SMP and CBPP) which means that any
beneficial effects (e.g. reductions in sovereign spreads) on public finances were indirect
(see e.g. Gibson et al (2015) for Greece). On the other hand, in practice, things are not
so clear. The ECB has supported Greek govenment bonds in several other ways. For
instance, as Sinn (2014) has pointed out and as we further discuss in subsection 3.2 below,
support to Greek private banks by the ECB has also been support to the government
since private banks can use the loans given by the ECB to purchase bonds which are in
turn used as collaterals for new loans from the ECB. In any case, as said, in our solutions
we will set the fraction held by the NCB and the ECB at zero. Finally, regarding the
model, note that we could add a secondary market for government bonds, in the sense
that the NCB or the ECB purchase a part or all of the inherited (beginning-of-period)
stock of bonds held by private agents/banks; we do not do it to avoid further additions
to an already large model.
28As mentioned above, the offi cial inter-governmental fiscal assistance to Greece since
2010 amounts to around 290 billion euros. This has been provided by the EFSF, the
ESM as well as by other euro states. These are loans to countries in need, like Greece,
after these countries sign a memorandum of understanding to implement an economic
adjustment programme (see e.g. Sinn (2014, chapter 8)). In the case of Greece, most of
this money has been used for public debt servicing payments which means the repayment
of maturing government debt, the service of interest payments on existing government
debt and various forms of bond exchanges that helped private banks and creditors to
offl oad their holdings of Greek government bonds. As a result, today, around 70% of
Greek public debt is owned by these European public institutions (see section 3.2 below
for data and further details). Since these holdings are recorded as public debt (see e.g.
the Greek Public Debt Management Agency and the Greek Ministry of Finance), we label
this as Greek public debt held by the EU.
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where, expressing them as fractions of total debt, we define:29
bdt ≡ λdt dt (24b)
bncbt ≡ λncbt dt (24c)
etp
∗
t
pt
fgt ≡ λ
g
t dt (24d)
etp
∗
t
pt
feut ≡ λeut dt (24e)
where 0 ≤ λdt , λncbt , λ
g
t , λ
eu
t ≤ 1 are the fractions of Greek public debt held
respectively by domestic private agents/banks, the NCB, foreign private
agents/banks and the EU, where λdt + λ
ncb
t + λ
g
t + λ
eu
t = 1.
30 If the policy
and rest-of-the-world variables, λncbt , λ
g
t and λ
eu
t , are exogenously given (they
will be set as in the data), then residually λdt = (1− λncbt − λ
g
t − λeut ).31
Government budget constraint Using this notation, the flow budget
constraint of the government written in per capita and real terms is:
gtrt + n
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pt
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)
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pt
mgg,t
]
+
+(1 + i∗t )
pt−1
pt
λdt−1dt−1 + (1 + i
∗)
pt−1
pt
λncbt−1dt−1+
+(1 + i∗t )
p∗t−1
p∗t
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pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λgt−1dt−1+
+(1 + i∗)
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
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pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λeut−1dt−1+
+
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ψg(.) ≡ dt +
Tt
N
+ rcbgt (25)
where gtrt is the lump-sum transfer to each household, n
b
[
wgt l
g
g,t +
pht
pt
(
ggg,t + g
i
g,t
)
+
pft
pt
mgg,t
]
is the cost of state firms, ψg(.) is a transaction cost function associated with
the government’s participation in the foreign capital market (defined right
below), TtN denotes tax revenues (defined right below) and rcb
g
t is a direct
29That is, if F gt denotes the nominal value of total public foreign debt expressed in
foreign currency, fgt ≡
F
g
t
p∗tN
is its per capita and real value
30As said, in our numerical solutions, we set λncbt ≡ 0.
31We have also experimented with the case in which the bonds bought by the EU have
more than one period maturity so as to capture the longer maturity of these loans in
reality. We report that adding multi-period safe loans by the EU (and the associated
interest rates) does not change our main results. Perhaps this is because optimizing
private agents are rational and forward-looking.
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transfer/dividend from the central bank to the Treasury.32 The rest of the
terms capture interest payments on public debt where notice that the inter-
est rates vary depending on the identity of the creditor. For instance, we
assume that when the government borrows from the EU or the ES, it pays
the constant world interest rate, i∗, only, while, when the government bor-
rows from the market, is pays the country’s interest rate, i∗t , which inludes
a premium (see subsection 2.8 below).
As in equation (4) above, we assume that the cost associated with par-
ticipation in the foreign financial market takes the form:
ψg(.) ≡ ψ
g
2
 etp∗tpt (nkfk,t + λgt dt)
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− f
2 nkyhi,t (26)
where ψg ≥ 0 is a transaction cost parameter associated with public bor-
rowing from foreign markets.
Total tax revenues in real (but not per capita) terms are defined as:
Tt
N
≡ τ ct [nk(
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pt
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pt
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pt
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(27)
One of the policy variables must follow residually to close the Treasury’s
budget constraint in (25); this is defined below after we present the budget
constraint of the NCB.
2.6.3 The National Central Bank (NCB) in the Eurosystem (ES)
Before we introduce the Greek NCB, we need to clarify how the balance sheet
of a NCB participating in the ES is related to the consolidated balance sheet
of the ES.
The ES and its NCBs The financial statement and the budget con-
straint of the ECB is not different from that of a standardized central bank.33
32See e.g. Walsh (2017, chapter 4), Reis (2013, 2017), Bassetto and Messer (2013),
Woodford (2016) and Benigno and Nistico (2017). In the ES, like with the purchase of
government bonds, there are rules applying to the amount of dividends distributed by
the ECB to each national fiscal authority. However, see e.g. Gros (2016) and Reis (2017,
section 10) for details and perhaps exceptions in the case of Greece.
33See e.g. “Annual consolidated balance sheet of the ES” and “User guide on the
ES consolidated weekly financial statement” (available at the site of the ECB). For the
conduct of monetary policy in the ES, see e.g. “The monetary policy of the ECB”(ECB,
2011, chapter 4).
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In other words, as is typically the case with central banks (see e.g. Reis
(2009, 2013) and Whelan (2014, section 2.1)), the assets side of the balance
sheet of the ECB consists mainly of foreign currency, loans to credit insti-
tutions34 and securities.35 The liabilities side, on the other hand, consists
mainly of banknotes in circulation (held by the non-bank public), reserves
which are also called current accounts (held by private banks at the cen-
tral bank) and government deposits; these are also the main items of the
monetary base of the ES.
However, the consolidated balance sheet of the ES shows assets and li-
abilities of the ES NCBs vis-à-vis third parties only. In other words, it
does not include credits and debits between the ES’s NCBs, known as Intra-
Eurosystem claims and liabilities and recorded respectively as TARGET2
assets and TARGET2 liabilities in the financial statements of the individual
NCBs participating in the ES. As first pointed out by Sinn and Wollmer-
shauser (2012) and Sinn (2014), and further studied by Whelan (2014, 2017),
Perotti (2020) and many others, these are net bilaterals positions vis-a-vis
the ES, which means that the NCB of a member country transferring money
abroad records a TARGET2 liability to the rest of the ES, while the NCB of
a member country receiving the money from abroad records a TARGET2 as-
set. These TARGET2 balances cancel each other out at aggregate ES level
(this is by construction) and therefore do not appear in the consolidated
balance sheet of the ES as described above.36 However, they do appear in
the balance sheets of the individual NCBs in the sense that they enter as an
extra item of liabilities for a country with Intra-Eurosystem liabilities like
Greece (see e.g. Whelan, 2014, Table 2) or as an extra item of assets for a
country with Intra-Eurosystem claims like Germany (see e.g. Whelan, 2014,
Table 3). In other words, for a country like Greece, TARGET2 liabilities
have become a part of the monetary base created by its NCB in accordance
with the rules of the ES.37
34This includes main refinancing operations (MROs), longer-term refinancing operations
(LTROs), marginal lending facilities, etc. It also inludes emergency liquidity assistance
(ELA) to private banks with severe liquidity problems.
35This includes the covered bond purchase program (CBPP), the securities markets
program (SMP), the asset purchase progrmme (APP) since 2015, etc.
36See e.g. Whelan (2014, 2017) and Perotti (2020) for the mechanics of the TARGET2
system and how assets and liabilities of both private banks and NCBs change in response to
various changes like moving money from a bank account in country A to a bank account
in country B. As Sinn (2014, p. 187) says, “the outflow of money from Greece goes
hand-in-hand with . . . the inflow of money into Germany, . . . in turn, leads to additional
liquidity that German banks do not need and which they therefore choose to lend to the
Bundesbank with the effect that the money is removed from the economy”.
37As Sinn (2014) has pointed out, a natural question to ask is whether NCBs in the
ES can freely issue liabilities in euros, namely, print banknotes, issue reserves and create
TARGET2 liabilities. The answer is a qualified "yes" (see e.g. Sinn (2014) and Whelan
(2014, 2017)) to the extent that they act according to the rules defined by the ECB council.
As said already, the latter has loosened the requirements for private banks obtaining loans,
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Looking at the data, as is well recognized, there was an explosion of
TARGET2 balances after 2008.38 For the ES as a whole, TARGET2 bal-
ances were very small prior to the crisis but have increased substantially
since then; they were 186 billion euros in May 2008, 416 billions in July
2011, 1.09 trillion in August 2012 and 1.24 trillion in September 2017 (see
Whelan (2017, Figure 1)). In the case of Greece, TARGET2 liabilities were,
for instance, 105 billion euros in 2011 which translates into 105/168=62%
of the total liabilities of the Greek NCB or 105/207=51% of GDP, and 94
billion euros in 2015, which translates into 94/163=58% of the total liabili-
ties of the Greek NCB or 94/177=53% of GDP.39 Actually, as we shall see
in the next section, in the case of Greece, TARGET2 liabilities have been
by far the largest item of liabilities, and hence of the monetary base of the
Greek NCB, in every year between 2008 and 2017 (included).
Before we move on, it is worth recalling that, since the publication of the
seminal paper by Sinn and Wollmershauser (2012), there has been a heated
debate at both academic and policy circles over the role of these assets and
liabilities. Opinions have ranged from TARGET2 being an innocent and
mechanical protocol of the ES to being a hidden bailout of the periphery EZ
countries in trouble (for the latter see Sinn (2014)). Today, to the best of our
understanding, there is a kind of consensus, in the sense that the enormous
magnitude of TARGET2 balances during the years of the debt crisis: (a) is
closely related to fears of default and a euro break up (b) is closely related
to loans to private banks and the ECB’s balance sheet policies in general
(c) facilated a capital flight from the periphery to the core (d) is not clearly
timed to current account deficits in the periphery (see e.g. Whelan (2014)
and Perotti (2020) for such a consensus).
Balance sheet and budget constraint of the Greek NCB Given
the above facts, on the side of assets of the Greek NCB, we will include loans
to private banks and government securities, while, on the side of liabilities,
we will include banknotes in circulation and TARGET2 liabilities. These
are the largest asset and liabilities items in the financial statemenst of the
Greek NCB (see subsection 3.2 for data).40 Then, the budget constraint of
has provided funding for longer periods, has allowed for ELA against collateral that was
not included in ECB’s list, etc.
38For TARGET2 data across euro area countries, see e.g. Whelan (2014, 2017). See also
e.g. “Target balances of participating NCBs”and “The ECB’s asset purchase programme
and TARGET balances: monetary policy implementation and beyond” (available at the
ECB’s site).
39As the data show (e.g. Whelan (2014, 2017)), the same happened in other periphery
countries of the EZ. For instance, in Ireland, TARGET2 liabilities peaked at 91% of GDP
in 2010 (see also Lane (2014) for Ireland).
40We do not include reserves held by private banks at the Greek NCB simply because
they are small in magnitude in the data. This is different from the ES level where most of
the increase in the monetary base of the ES has been in the form of reserves (see "Annual
consolidated balance sheet of the ES" available at the ECB’s site). See also e.g. Reis
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the NCB linking changes in assets and liabilities is (written in real and per
capita terms):
nkzp,t + λ
ncb
t dt + rcb
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≡
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pt−1
pt
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)
+
(
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pt−1
pt
TARGt−1
)
+
+nk(1 + izt )
pt−1
pt
zp,t−1 + (1 + i
∗
t )
pt−1
pt
λncbt−1dt−1 (28)
where nkzp,t is the end-of period loans to private banks, λncbt dt ≡ bncbt is
the end-of-period government bonds purchased by the NCB (however, for
the reasons explained in subsection 2.6.2 above, we will set λncbt ≡ 0 in
our baseline solutions), rcbgt is the direct transfer/dividend from the NCB
to its government (as said above, this is the NCB’s balance-sheet earnings
rebated to the Treasury), hnt denotes the end-of-period stock of banknotes
in circulation and TARGt denotes the end-of-period stock of TARGET2
liabilities (for notational simplicity, which is also close to the data, we assume
that the refinancing rate on TARGET2 balances is zero). In other words,
in our model, hnt + TARGt ≡MBt is the monetary base of the Greek NCB
within the ES (these variables are written in real and per capita values).
In equilibrium, in our model, banknotes in circulation will be equal to the
currency demanded by the public for liquidity-providing services, namely,
hnt = n
khk,t + n
whw,t + n
bhb,t in each t. In this case, TARGET2 liabilities
are the difference betweenMBt and nkhk,t+nwhw,t+nbhb,t. In other words,
to the extent that the monetary base of the NCB exceeds the amount of
currency held by the public for liquidity services,41 or, loosely speaking, to
the extent that the funds made available by the NCB are not only used to
hold a larger stock of money balances, the country has a TARGET2 liability
to the rest of the ES.42
We should make two further points here regarding TARGET2 liabilities.
First, they are possible because, in a currency union (CU), the money market
clears at a CU level rather than at local/national level. Second, the way in
which these cross-country liabilities affect the real economy, and how they
can be used, will become clear below when we present the country’s balance
of payments (as said in subsection 2.6.1 above, this is our formal criterion
to judge if a balance-sheet monetary policy item affects national resources).
One of the monetary policy variables must adjust residually to close the
budget constraint in (28); this is defined below jointly with the fiscal policy
variable that closes the Treasury’s budget constraint in (25).
(2009) and Sims and Wu (2020) for liabilities of the FED, where reserves have played a
big role.
41Or, equivalently, since assets are equal to liabilities by definition, to the extent that
the claims of the NCB on its private sector exceed the amount of currency held for liquidity
services.
42We are grateful to Hans-Werner Sinn for comments on this issue. Any errors are ours.
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2.6.4 Budget constraint of the consolidated public sector
To the extent that the transfer/dividend from the NCB to its government,
rcbgt , is free and can be treated as an endogenous variable, we can combine
the budget constraint of the Treasury in (25) and the budget constraint
of the NCB in (28) into a single constraint, the budget identity of the
consolidated public sector (see e.g. Reis (2017) and Benigno and Nistico
(2017) for details). That is, by also using the market-clearing condition
hnt = n
khk,t +n
whw,t +n
bhb,t, we get (written in real and per capita terms):
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where all variables have been defined above.
Inspection of the above constraint confirms some standard properties,
but it also reveals some distinct features of the ES. Regarding standard
properties, the NCB’s purchase of government bonds, λncbt dt, as well as the
provision of transfers/dividends to its own government, rcbgt , do not appear
in the consolidated government budget constraint. As said above, this is sim-
ply because when the NCB transfers resources to its own government, or vice
versa, one type of liability replaces another (see Reis (2009, 2013, 2017) and
also Bassetto and Messer (2013), Woodford (2016) and Benigno and Nistiko
(2017)). As a consequence, the NCB can only generate revenue for its gov-
ernment through the real value of seigniorage,
(
Hnt −Hnt−1
pt
≡ hnt −
pt−1
pt
hnt−1
)
,
whose size is an empirical matter. This is standard. On the other hand,
the same constraint reveals how, in a currency union, a single central bank
like the ECB, that faces different fiscal authorities, can redistribute resources
and thereby alleviate the fiscal burden of member-countries in need (see Reis
(2017, section 10)). In particular, as the above constraint reveals, this can
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be done via purchases of government bonds beyond those purchased by the
NCB (see the term λeut dt which, as said, can, in principle at least, include
ECB’s holdings) and by the permission to issue TARGET2 liabilities to the
extent that this issue is beyond the amount of currency held by the public
for liquidity services. As we shall see, the very same terms will also ap-
pear in the balance of payments presented below. Finally, it is worth adding
that had we allowed for direct transfers/dividends by the ECB beyond those
provided by the NCB, these transfers/dividends would also remain in the
budget constraint of the consolidated public sector (as well as, in the bal-
ance of payments below) and hence could play a redistributive allocative
role similar to that played by λeut dt and TARGET2 liabilities.
As in (25) and (28) above, one policy variable must adjust residually to
close (29); this is defined right below.
2.6.5 Fiscal-monetary policy regime
By policy regime, we typically mean a choice of which policy variables are set
by the policy authorities and which have to follow endogenously/residually
to accommodate the policy decisions made (see e.g. Reis (2009)).
Inspection of the budget constraints of the Treasury and the NCB, in
(25) and (28) respectively, reveal the various options available to fiscal and
monetary authorities or, equivalently, the possible policy regimes. In other
words, once one allows for a more realistic menu of monetary policy instru-
ments as we have done here (in particular, assets and liabilities of the NCB
and the associated policy interest rates), there is a wide range of policy
regimes even in a small open economy within a currency union or with fixed
exchange rates.
Here, to capture the fiscal austerity mix adopted by the Greek gov-
ernments, the shutting out of the country from international private capital
markets, as well as the offi cial fiscal bailouts and the plethora of accommoda-
tive quantitative monetary policies followed by the ECB towards Greece
during the sovereign debt crisis years, we will set all tax rates, all types of
government spending as shares of GDP, the public debt-to-GDP ratio jointly
with its decomposition to various holders (including the foreign public in-
stitutions, labeled as EU in our model), as they have been in the actual
data over the crisis years, and then assume that the transfer/dividend from
the NCB to the government, rcbgt , is residually determined by the NCB’s
budget constraint in (28), which implies, as said above, that the budget
constraint of the NCB and the budget constraint of the Treasury can be
merged into the single consolidated budget constraint in (29), and, in turn,
assume that the latter is satisfied by adjustments in the monetary base.
Actually, to the extent that the monetary base consists of banknotes in
circulation and TARGET2 liabilities, MBt ≡ hnt + TARGt, where the ban-
knotes in circulation are determined by the currency demanded by the public
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for liquidity-providing services, hnt = n
khk,t + n
whw,t + n
bhb,t, endogeneity
of the change in the monetary base practically means endogeneity of the
cross-border liquidity term,
(
TARGt − Pt−1Pt TARGt−1
)
. In other words, we
assume that the ECB has been following an accommodative policy towards
Greece, in the sense that it has increased its monetary base and specifi-
cally the issuance of TARGET2 liabilities so as to accommodate the rest of
policies as well as the macroeconomic developments occurring at the same
time. At least at regional/national level, this is a regime of fiscal dominance
meaning active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy (see e.g. Walsh
(2017, chapter 4)).43 The list of endogenous variables and the exogenously
set policy instruments in the final macroeconomic system is presented in
detail in Appendix C of the supplementary file.
2.7 Balance of payments
If we add up the budget constraints of all agents, we get the country’s
resource constraint or its balance of payments (written in real and per capita
terms):
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(30)
Inspection of the balance of payments reveals the cross-country redis-
tributive role that the ECB can play at least in principle. This can be done
43As Reis (2019) points out, fiscal dominance at the EZ level has been avoided. On the
other hand, monetary accommodation (via e.g. TARGET2 balances, purchase of national
government bonds, sharing of ECB’s dividends, provision of ELA, etc) has worked like
fiscal dominance in those member-countries hit by the crisis.
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by purchases of government bonds beyond those purchased by the NCB (see
the term λeut dt which, as said above, can include ECB’s holdings) and by
allowing the NCB to issue excess liquidity in the form of TARGET2 lia-
bilities to the rest of the ES (see the term TARGt − pt−1pt TARGt−1, which,
also as said above, becomes possible when the monetary base of the NCB
exceeds the amount of currency held by the public for liquidity services).44
As is revealed by (30), these items can be used to finance imported goods,
to repay foreign debt or to finance investments abroad.
A final clarification of the role of TARGET2 : As pointed out by Sinn
(2014, p. 180), our term
(
TARGt − pt−1pt TARGt−1
)
is the increase in “the
amount of central bank credit that has been issued in excess of liquidity
needs for transactions within the NCB’s national jurisdiction”. Had the
economy been closed, or had we have a small open economy with a national
currency, this term could not be present in the balance of payments; there
could not be any use of extra self-created money in those cases. Here, it
becomes possible thanks to participation in a currency union which means
that the money market clears at currency union level, rather than at national
level within each jurisdiction, and that the currency issued (euro) works like
an "international" currency at least within the EZ.45
2.8 Country’s interest rate
Following most of the literature on small open economies (e.g. Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2003) and Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017)), we assume
that the interest rate at which the country (meaning both private and public
agents) borrows from abroad, i∗t , is public debt-elastic (except in the case in
which it borrows from non-market institutions like the EU). In particular,
we use the functional form:
i∗t = i
∗ + ψ∗
exp( dt
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− d)− 1
 (31)
where ψ∗ is an interest-rate premium parameter and the parameter d ≥ 0
is a threshold value for the public debt-to-GDP ratio above which country
premia emerge (for details and references, see Philippopoulos et al (2017a)).
44The same can happen, as said above, via direct transfers/dividends provided by the
ECB beyond those provided by the country’s NCB.
45To make the point clearer, consider a miniature version of our model without financial
intermediaries, a government or foreign assets. The budget constraints of the private sector
and the NCB are respectively ct + ∆ht = yt + ∆zt and ∆zt = ∆MBt = ∆ht + ∆TARGt,
where ht is currency held by the private agent, zt is a loan from the NCB (assume a zero
interest rate), MBt denotes the monetary base, ∆xt ≡ xt− xt−1 and the rest are obvious
and are as in the paper above. Then, adding them up, the economy’s resource constraint
or its balance of payments is ct = yt+∆TARGt. We are grateful to Hans-Werner Sinn for
this model specification. Note that if the currency is national, so that the money market
clears at national level, ht = zt and hence TARGt = 0 at any t.
34
2.9 How we will work from now on
Market-clearing conditions and the macroeconomic system are respectively
presented in Appendices B and C of the supplementary file. The macro-
economic system consists of 51 equations in 51 variables. This is given the
paths of the exogenously set policy variables and the degree of property
rights, whose values will be set as in the data.
In the next sections, we will parameterize the model, present the data
and in turn solve the system numerically. Our quantitative analysis will
consist of the following steps. First, after presenting parameter values and
Greek data, we will get a stationary solution using data of the year 2008.
As we shall see, this solution can match reasonably well the main features of
the data before the eruption of the crisis and can thus serve as a departure
point in what follows. This is in section 3. In turn, departing from the
2008 solution, sections 4 and 5 will study the period 2008-2019 which are
the years of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. In particular, we will feed
the model with the time-series of our exogenous forces (changes in policy
variables, institutional quality, etc) as they have been in the time-series in
the data. This will allow us to provide a quantitative assessment of the main
drivers of the Greek depression between 2008 and 2016. In these solutions,
along the transition of the economy to its new stationary equilibrium, we
will assume that after 2019 (this is the last year that data for all exogenous
variables are available) the model’s exogenous variables remain as in 2019.
But, we will also experiment with various counter-factual scenarios since
2008 that could have possibly made the economic downturn milder or worse.
Finally, departing from the 2019 solution, in section 6, we will study the new
economic crisis triggered by the convid-19 pandemic.
We will assume that all this is common knowledge so that we solve under
perfect foresight using a Newton-type non-linear method implemented in
DYNARE.
3 Parameterization, data and solution for 2008
To make quantitative predictions, we need to solve the model numerically. In
subsection 3.1, we will present structural parameters related to technology
and preferences. In subsection 3.2, using relevant data from Greece, we
will specify the driving forces of the model, namely, the time paths of the
exogenously set policy variables and the degree of property rights. This
will also provide empirical support for some key assumptions of the model.
Subsection 3.3 will then present the stationary solution of the model when
we use data for the year 2008 which was the last year before the sovereign
debt crisis in Greece.
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3.1 Parameter values
Regarding structural parameters for technology and preferences, for most
of them, we will use commonly employed values, while the rest will be cali-
brated so as the model to mimic some key Greek statistics. Parameter values
are listed in Table 1. We report at the outset that our main results are ro-
bust to changes in these baseline parameter values at least within reasonable
ranges.
Starting with preference parameters, the time discount factors of savers
and borrowers, β and βk, are set at 0.99 and 0.98 repectively so as to give
a lending interest rate above the saving interest rate. The weights given
to private consumption, leisure and real money holdings, µ1, µ2 and µ3
in households’utility function, are set respectively at 0.40, 0.55 and 0.03,
while the remaining, 0.02, goes to utility-enhancing public goods/services;
these values produce work hours, etc, within usual ranges. The degree of
preference of home goods over foreign goods, ν, is set at the neutral value
of 0.5; this value also contributes to delivering reasonable ratios of home to
foreign goods in households’consumption spending.
Continuing with technology parameters, in the production function of
private goods, the exponent of labor, 1 − α, is set at 0.6, while, the rest,
a = 0.4, is the exponent of the CES term that includes capital and imported
goods. In the same production function, the contribution of productivity-
enhancing public goods/services to private production, σ, is set at 0.1. The
work productivity parameters of entrepreneurs and workers in the private
good production function, Ak and Aw, are set at 3 and 2 respectively; this
difference produces a skilled wage premium within usual ranges. In the
private firm’s production function, the parameter measuring the intensity
of capital vis-a-vis imported goods, χp, as well as the parameter measur-
ing the substitutability between capital and imported goods, op, are both
set at 0.5; the same value of 0.5 is used for χg and og in the state firm’s
production function. Also in the state firms’production function, the Cobb-
Douglas exponents of public capital and public employment, θ1 and θ2, are
set respectively at 0.3045 and 0.6, which correspond to payments for public
investment and public wages, expressed as shares of total public payments
to all inputs used in the production of public goods, as they are in the data
(for similar practice, see e.g. Economides et al (2014) and the references
therein); in turn, the Cobb-Douglas exponent of goods purchased from the
private sector, 1−θ1−θ2, follows residually. Both private and public capital
depreciation rates, δ and δg, are set at 0.05. Similarly, both TFP parameters
(in the private and in the public sector production functions) are normalized
at 1 (note that public sector effi ciency, and why it may differ from private
sector effi ciency, is crucial but is not an issue in this paper). In the baseline
simulations, the Dixit-Stiglitz parameter capturing imperfect competition
in product markets, θ, is set at 0.75; this is close to the literature (see e.g.
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Eggertsson et al (2014)) and produces a profit ratio around 10%. In the
rent-seeking technology, the power coeffi cient is set at 0.5, which is common
across all types of agents, while the effectiveness parameters of public em-
ployees, entrepreneurs and workers, Γb, Γk and Γw, are set respectively at
1.3, 1 and 0.7 to reflect their relative political power in rent extraction.
The transaction cost parameters associated with capital changes in the
firm’s problem, private bank loans to firms and NCB loans to private banks,
ξk, ξl and ξz, are all set at 0.3, while the "anti-transaction" cost parame-
ter associated with government bonds held by private banks, ξb, is simply
set at zero. The Rotemberg-type parameter associated with price changes
in the firm’s problem, ξp, is set at 3. The two transaction cost parame-
ters associated with private and public participation in the foreign capital
market, ψp and ψg, are set at 0.5. The risk premium parameter in the debt-
elastic interest rate rule, ψ∗, is set at 0.05; this belongs to usual ranges and
also produces a foreign debt to GDP ratio as in the data when the crisis
erupted. The fixed world interest rate, i∗, is set at 1%. The two parameters
in the function of exports, Θ and ϑ, are set at 0.5 and 2 respectively; these
values contribute to producing a trade deficit close to the data. The thresh-
old values of public debt and foreign debt as shares of GDP, above which
problems start, are set at 1.1 and 0.8 respectively which are values close to
those in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The parameters in the two inequality
borrowing constraints, ρl and ρz, are set at 0.5.
Finally, the population fractions of public employees, nb, and self-employed
or entrepreneurs, nk, are set at 0.2 and 0.2 respectively as in the data, so
that the fraction of workers, nw, follows residually at 0.6.
Table 1: Baseline parameterization
3.2 Data and facts during the Greek sovereign debt crisis
2008-2019
In this subsection, we present the data used for the modelling of the exoge-
nous variables in the numerical solutions. In doing so, we will also shed light
to some relatively unnoticed features of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The
same data will support some key assumptions of our model.
As has already been said in the Introductory section above, there were
at least three notable developments in the Greek economy after 2008. First,
Greece resorted to international financial assistance provided by other EU
countries, European institutions (EFSF, EFSM, ESM and the ECB) and the
IMF. Second, as a condition for the assistance received, Greece was forced
to take severe fiscal austerity measures and to promise the implementation
of structural reforms in product and labor markets. Third, the fiscal aus-
terity measures taken and the severe economic downturn that followed were
accompanied by a sharp deterioration in institutional quality. These three
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distinct developments are the main driving forces in our model; the rest is
structural reforms captured by simple changes in parameter values like the
Dixit-Stiglitz product substitutability parameter (see below). In what fol-
lows, we briefly comment on the main driving forces and present the data
used in our solutions over 2008-2019. As said above, the new covid-19 crisis
will be studied in section 6.
3.2.1 International financial assistance (fiscal and monetary)
In the case of Greece, over the years of the debt crisis 2008-2019, offi cial
fiscal rescue operations have been expressed by three bailouts. The first
took place in 2010-11 through the Greek Loan Facility, the second in 2012-
2015 through the EFSF and the third in 2015-2018 through the ESM (see
ESM (2018) for details). These programs were completed in August 2018 so
the country is no longer reliant on ongoing offi cial rescue loans. The total
amount received by Greece since 2010 is around 290 billion euros which is
the largest financial assistance package in history. As explained above, most
of this has been used for public debt servicing payments.46 As a result,
today, close to 70% of Greek public debt is owned by public institutions
(member states of the euro area, EFSF, ESM, ECB, etc).
Data for public debt, as well as the fractions of it held by public institu-
tions, λeut , and foreign private investors/banks, λ
g
t , over time, are reported
in Table 2, while the rest is in the hands of domestic private investors/banks,
λdt . In other words, as explained in subsection 2.6.2 above, we set λ
ncb
t ≡ 0
and λdt = (1 − λncbt − λ
g
t − λeut ). Notice that, in our solutions, the offi cial
fiscal bailouts are captured by setting the time-paths of total public debt to
GDP, as well as its decomposition among the four holders, as they are in
these data.
Table 2: Greek public debt and its main holders
Regarding monetary policy,47 conventional responses by the ECB in-
cluded a sharp reduction of policy interest rates, while non-conventional
responses, focusing on those related to Greece and other EZ periphery coun-
tries in trouble, included a fixed rate full allotment loan policy to private
46See e.g. Bortz (2015), Rocholl and Stahmer (2016) and ESM (2017, 2018) for a
detailed decomposition, that is, how the loans were used by Greece in the three offi cial
bailout programs. Most of the rest of the bailout money has been used to finance the
cost of the haircut in March 2012 (this is the so-called private sector involvement (PSI),
according to which privately held governments bonds took a 53.5% cut of their face value,
which corresponds to 107 billion euros reduction, although, with an exchange of EFSF
bonds, the overall debt burden decreased by 52 billion euros only) and the cost of bank
recapitalization.
47For the ECB’s response to the crisis, see e.g. Sinn (2010, 2014), ECB (2011), Sibert
(2012) and De Grauwe (2016).
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banks subject to lower collateral standards, the extension of maturity of liq-
uidity provision, the issuance of ELA credit under the guarantee of the NCB
to help private banks overcome liquidity crises and probably insolvency prob-
lems, and the purchase of collateral themselves on the secondary market (e.g.
the Securities Markets Programme, SMP, in 2011) to support their market
price and keep the interest rates relatively low.48 Furthermore, when uncer-
tainty got worse in the summer of 2012, the ECB announced that it would
buy an unlimited amount of government bonds in the secondary market if
that would become necessary (this is the Outright Monetary Transactions,
OMT, program), under the condition that the ECB is actively involved,
as part of the so-called Troika meaning the EC, the IMF and the ECB, in
the monitoring of budgetray policies in the countries in need (see e.g. De
Grauwe (2016, pp. 174-175, 210)). Eventually, in early 2015, the ECB de-
cided to start offi cially its QE asset-purchasing program although this did
not apply to Greece being under a memorandum of understanding at that
time. In addition, since the very early days of the debt crisis, there has been
a big rise in TARGET2 liabilities as studied in some detail in subsection 2.6
above.
Tables 3a and 3b present the main items in the balance sheets of the
Bank of Greece. As can be seen, TARGET2 balances have the lion’s share
of liabilities, while loans to private banks are the biggest item on the asset
side. Recall that, in our model, the accommodative and complex role played
by the ECB during the Greek debt crisis is captured by treating the change
in TARGET2 liabilities,
(
TARGt − Pt−1Pt TARGt−1
)
, as an endogenously
determined variable (see subsection 2.6.5 above). Also, for simplicity, we
will set the nominal interest rate on loans from the NCB to private banks,
izt , at zero, and, as explained in subsection 2.6.3, the same applies to the
nominal interest rate on TARGET2 liabilities to the rest of the ES. On the
other hand, the role of the ECB during the new covid-19 crisis is analysed
in section 6 below.
Table 3a: Bank of Greece’s assets
Table 3b: Bank of Greece’s liabilities
48Some details: In addition to its active support to the banking system, the ECB,
during 2011-2012, bought a limited amount of government securities of southern euro
zone countries including Greece under SMP; see e.g. Sinn (2014, pp. 147, 259) and De
Grauwe (2016, pp. 210-2). In the case of Greece, since the collaterals, used for this
credit, mainly consisted of Greek government bonds (i.e. the commercial banks were the
largest holders of government bonds), these measures effectively constituted an indirect
government financing through the ECB; see e.g. Sinn (2014, pp. 151, 158) and De Grauwe
(2016, pp. 173-175, 210-2). Besides, as has been noted by several authors (see e.g. Sinn,
2014), there is no real difference between the controversial SMP and massive lending to
private banks from the ECB, since private banks can use the extra liquidity to invest in
bonds of distressed governments which can in turn be used as collaterals in new credit
from the ECB.
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3.2.2 The stick: fiscal austerity and structural reforms
The above described financial aid was provided under the condition that
Greece undertakes a severe fiscal austerity plan (a description of the Greek
austerity plan is in e.g. Alesina et al (2019, chapter 8) and Alogoskoufis
(2019)). Irrespectively of the arguments for and against it, the fact is that
Greece adopted a comprehensive fiscal consolidation plan including a high
tax burden and cuts in various items of public spending. Data for total
government revenue and expenditure are reported in Table 4a, while data
for effective tax rates (τy and τ c) and the main categories of public spending
as shares of GDP (si, sg, str and sw) are reported in Table 4b (the GDP share
of public spending on imported goods, sm, is arbitrarily set at 0.03). These
time-series will be used for the exogenously set fiscal and public finance
variables in our numerical solutions.
Table 4a: Total government revenue and expenditure
Table 4b: Fiscal (spending-tax) policy variables
It should also be added here that, in addition to the fiscal austerity
measures taken, Greece had adopted the commitment to maintain a pri-
mary surplus of 3.5% of GDP until 2022 and around 2% in the following
years (this has been postponed until the end of the new covid-19 crisis).
It has also promised to implement structural (non-fiscal) reforms in labor
and product markets, as well as in the functioning of its public sector (see
e.g. ESM, 2018). Such much-needed reforms however still lag behind (see
e.g. Rocholl and Stahmer (2016) and Masuch et al. (2018)), despite the
optimism expressed by the European Commission (2019) in its enhanced
surveillance report on Greece. In any case, as said above, structural reforms
in the product market can be easily captured by changes in the Dixit-Stiglitz
parameter, θ (see next section).
3.2.3 Institutional quality
Figure 1a presents our index for the enforcement of property rights in Greece.
This index has been constructed as the average of three sub-indices: "the
rule of law", "regulatory quality" and "political stability and absence of
violence/terrorism", which are three variables commonly used for the con-
struction of a measure of property rights protection (the data have been
rescaled from 0 to 1). This index will be used for the time-series of the
exogenous PRt in our numerical solutions.
Figure 1a: Property rights in Greece
Since institutional quality is a relative thing, for comparison, we also
present some cross-country data. The same three sub-indices, now in various
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EZ countries including Greece, are shown in Figures 1b, 1c and 1d (these
Figures have been borrowed from Christou et al. (2020)). As can be seen,
Greece, not only has always been a country with poor institutional quality,
but, to make it worse, it experienced a sharp deterioration after 2008, as
has also been pointed out by e.g. Micossi (2016), Papaioannou (2016) and
Masuch et al. (2018).
Figure 1b: Rule of law, comparison to other countries
Figure 1c: Regulatory quality, comparison to other countries
Figure 1d: Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism,
comparison to other countries
3.3 Solution for the pre-crisis year 2008
Using the parameter values listed in Table 1 and data of the year 2008, the
stationary solution of the model is reported in Tables 5a and 5b (we report
some key variables only). In this solution, variables do not change (so it can
be thought as the "trend" of the Greek economy before the global financial
crisis) and all exogenous variables have been set as in the data of the year
2008. The solution is in line with data averages over 2000-2008 and can
thus provide a reasonable departure for the changes that have been taking
place since 2009 and are studied in the next sections. In particular, the
solution does a relatively good job at mimicking the position of the country
in the international capital market, as well as the consumption-investment
behavior of the private sector over the pre-crisis years.
Tables 5a and 5b: Solution for the year 2008
4 What happened between 2008 and 2019
In this section, departing from the 2008 solution, we feed the model with the
time paths of policy variables and the index of property rights as they are in
the data. In doing so, we assume that after 2019 the values of these variables
remain unchanged as in 2019 which is the last value available in the data
as this paper is written. In what follows, we will report both aggregate and
distributional implications. Recall that this is without taking into account
the covid-19 shock that hit the Greek economy in 2020 (this will be studied
in section 6).
4.1 Aggregate effects
Our baseline simulation for GDP, as well as its actual path in the data, are
illustrated in Graph 1, where the numbers indicate the percentage change
in output relative to the 2008 solution. As can be seen, our model solution
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can mimic relatively well the actual behaviour of GDP over the crisis years,
especially its cumulative change. For example, between 2008 and 2016, the
total output loss generated by the model is 22.7% (namely, 100 − 77.3 =
22.7), while it was 26.2% (namely, 100−73.8 = 26.2) in the actual data. On
the other hand, it should be acknowledged that the model fails, for example,
to generate the economic downturn in 2013 and the relative recovery after
2016; this is not surprising since here we have deliberately focused on two
exogenous factors only (the policy package and institutional quality) leaving
aside a lot of other economic and political factors that were happening at
the same time. Given this, we feel that the model is empirically plausible
and can allow us to draw some useful policy implications.
Graph 1: Output loss and the data
In Graph 2, we decompose the simulated output loss into its main drivers.
As the graph reveals, about 13% of the loss is due to the economic ajust-
ment package adopted (where the latter includes fiscal austerity, structural
reforms and the various forms of international financial assistance). Another
9.8% (specifically, 87.1 − 77.3) is due to the deterioration of institutional
quality since 2008. The role of the latter is striking.
Graph 2: Output loss and its main drivers
4.2 Distributional effects
Our solution also allows us to quantify the distributional implications of
the aggregate output loss during the debt crisis year. Recall that we have
three distinct income groups in the model, entrepreneurs, private workers
and public employees, as modeled in subsection 2.2 above. Graph 3 depicts
respectively the simulated time paths of the worker’s to entrepreneur’s net
income ratio and of the public employee’s to entrepreneur’s net income ratio
over the debt crisis years 2008-2019 (net incomes are defined in Appendix A.7
of the supplementary file). These paths follow by using the model’s solution
into the budget constraints of the three types of households in subsection
2.2.
Graph 3: Distributional effects
Inspection of Graph 3 reveals that, after an improvement at the start of
the crisis, the net income gap between workers and entrepreneurs became
wider. The same applies to the net income gap between public sector em-
ployees and entrepreneurs. Putting them together, these two graphs imply
that inequality has worsened, although the big losers from the debt crisis
have been the private workers. Their net income has suffered more than
that of public employees and, although it has somehow managed to recover
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after a sharp fall in the early years of the crisis, their share remains below
that in the pre-crisis years.
Although we do not have access to actual data so as to compare them to
our simulated paths, we believe our results are in line with the widespread
belief that the global financial crisis, as well as the policy mix chosen to deal
with its effects, has mainly hurt those who are unskilled and work in the pri-
vate sector (see e.g. Bourguignon (2018) for evidence across several countries
and Andriopoulou et al. (2018) specifically for the Greek economy).
5 Counterfactuals between 2008 and 2019
In this section, we conduct two types of experiments. First, we consider
what would have happened since 2008 without international financial aid.
Second, we study what would have happened since 2008 if, given aid, some
things had been done a bit better. Recall again that this is without taking
into account the covid-19 shock that hit the Greek economy in 2020 (this
will be studied in section 6).
5.1 Counterfactuals: It could have been much worse
We first switch off fiscal aid. This is to examine what would have happened
if EU states and institutions had not stepped in to repay debt obligations
and to purchase the Greek sovereign debt when the country was shut out
of the bond market and trust was lost. Say, for example, that the Greek
government would have to increase income taxes, τy, to make up for the
loss in public revenue due to setting λeu ≡ 0. This experiment is shown in
Graph 4. As can be seen, in this case, the depression would be much deeper
and, most probably, would have triggered a severe social unrest.
Graph 4: Counterfactual: No fiscal bailout
We have also attempted to switch offTARGET2 balances, which, as we
have seen, has been the main form of monetary policy aid from the ECB to
Greece. This is to examine what would have happened if the ES, via the
Greek NCB, had not followed an accommodative monetary policy towards
Greece. In this case, we report that our model does not exhibit dynamic
stability.49 In simple words, we cannot get a solution. This - according
to our view - confirms the important role played by the ECB in the Greek
bailout.
49When we set the change in TARGET2 liabilities exogenously (in this particular coun-
terfactual, equal to zero) another fiscal, or balance-sheet monetary, policy variable has to
take its place in the category of endogenous variables. We have experimented with various
possibilities. None of them delivers a stable solution over this period.
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5.2 Counterfactuals: It could have been much better
In this subsection, we restore financial (fiscal and monetary) aid, as in the
baseline simulations of section 4, and examine what would have happened
if some things had been done slightly better.
Graphs 5 and 6 illustrate respectively the simulated paths of GDP when
we assume lower income tax rates and higher public spending other things
equal. That is, in these graphs, there is a milder fiscal austerity. In partic-
ular, in Graph 5, we have arbitrarily set the income tax rates 2 percentage
points (pp) lower than in the data in each year, while, in Graph 6, we have
arbitrarily assumed that each item of public spending, as share of GDP, is
2 pp higher than in the data in each year. Notice that we change one thing
at a time. As can be seen, the output loss would be milder, although the
gains are small. Also note that, in these cases, the cut in taxes, or the rise
in spending, are like free lunches because any fiscal expansion has been as-
sumed to be accommodated by a rise in TARGET2 liabilities which continue
to adjust residually. By contrast, in Graph 7, we assume a "budget neutral"
fiscal policy mix, in the sense that income tax rates are cut by 2 pp (or
public investment, as share of GDP, rises by 2 pp), but, at the same time,
transfers as share of GDP are also cut by 2 pp. In this more realistic fiscal
scenario, again the output loss would be milder but not by much. In Graph
8, we assume a stronger liberalization in product markets. In particular,
we assume that the Dixit-Stiglitz parameter of product substitutability gets
closer to its value in the core countries of the EZ (from 0.775 to 0.80); these
numbers are similar to those used by Eggertsson et al (2014). Again there
is a milder depression but again we cannot see spectacular improvements.
Finally, in Graph 9, we combine the scenaria of Graphs 7 and 8, and, more
importantly, we now set the index of property rights as it it was in the
Greek data before the crisis (specifically, we keep PRt constant at its 2009
value for ever).50 In this case, the output loss would be only 9.9% (namely,
100− 90.1 = 9.9), which is close to that experienced by other EZ periphery
countries hit by the global financial crisis. This confirms, once more, the
key detrimental role played by institutional deterioration during the Greek
50The deterioration of institutional quality in the period 2008-2016, which is clearly
seen in the data, is characterized by two main milestones. The first concerns the violent
demonstrations, accompanied by extensive destruction of private property, in the center
of Athens, in December 2008. The second concerns the political polarization and lack
of political consensus since 2010, which was the year of the first memorandum of under-
standing offering financial assistance in exchange of fiscal austerity and structural reforms
(the so called economic adjustment program). All these developments, fuelled by political
commentators, led to strikes, protests and even terrorist attacks, which further deterio-
rated institutional quality and undermined economic confidence and sentiments. In the
scenario, in which we investigate what would have happened if the quality of institutions
had not been deteriorated, we assume that institutional quality remains at its 2009 value
and not at its 2008 one, because the events of 2008 preceded the economic adjustment
program and its implications.
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depression.
Graph 5: Counterfactual: Less fiscal austerity - lower taxes
Graph 6: Counterfactual: Less fiscal austerity - higher spending
Graph 7: Counterfactual: Alternative fiscal mixes
Graph 8: Counterfactual: Stronger product market liberalization
Graph 9: Putting counterfactuals together
6 The new covid-19 crisis and policies from now
on
In the beginning of 2020, the world was stricken by the covid-19 pandemic
which, at the time of this writing, is expected to cause a severe economic
downturn worldwide. A public finance crisis is also expected to follow as
most governments have stepped in and new "unprecedented" fiscal and mon-
etary policies have been adopted or promised to be adopted. Greece is not
an exception. Actually, the pandemic struck the Greek economy when it
was on a moderate growth path after years of depression as analysed above.
Also, the pandemic finds Greece with limited fiscal space (its public debt
was already around 175% of GDP in the end of 2019).
This raises (at least) two interrelated questions: First, what will be the
depth and the length (i.e. the size and the duration) of the economic down-
turn? Second, what are the right policy reactions to the new economic crisis?
As is widely recognized (see e.g. European Commission (2020a)), although
the shock is symmetric hurting most countries, its effects will be uneven
depending, except from the severity of the pandemic and the stringency of
the containment measures in each country, on how the shock propagates to
each economy, the initial conditions and the way each country responds to
the economic downturn. In this section, using our macroeconomic model for
Greece and the lessons from the debt crisis in 2008-2016, we will try to give
quantitative answers to these questions.
6.1 An informal description of model changes
Although there are many ways in which the pandemic can trigger an econ-
omy crisis, here, following most of the related literature (see e.g. Eichenbaum
et al (2020)), we assume that the drop of economic activity is triggered by
an adverse labor supply shock. This is because the impact effect of the
covid-19 shock has been mainly on employment; this has happened through
compulsory lockdown but also through absenteeism, sickness and precau-
tionary behavior as people have reacted to the health risk by reducing their
labor supply. Therefore, following Eichenbaum et al (2020), we assume that
households’labor supply is restricted in the sense that they can supply only
a fraction 0 < Φt ≤ 1 of the labor supply that they would had supplied
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in the absence of the pandemic other things equal.51 This restriction on
the labor supply is translated into a corresponding cut in labor income (ex-
cept from the labor income of public employees which we assume to remain
uncut).52 As in Eichenbaum et al (2020), at least in our baseline scenario
below, we will set Φt at 0.8 in 2020 and 1 afterwards meaning back to Greek
normality in 2021 onwards. As we shall see, even this relatively mild shock,
propagated via the various demand and supply channels of our macroeco-
nomic model, can lead to a severe economy-wide downturn accompanied by
a sharp deterioration in public finances.
In addition to the Φt shock and its impact effect on labour supply, the
only thing that changes (relative to the model used so far for the study of
the Greek debt crisis) is the treatment of public debt. Since Greece exited
its economic adjustment program in August 2018, which among other things
means that nowadays the Greek government borrows from the market rather
than from European public institutions, we assume that public debt is the
public financing variable that adjusts to close the budget identity of the
consolidated government sector. Recall that, by contrast, during the period
of the economic adjustment program in 2010-2018, we assumed that it was
TARGET2 liabilities that played this role with the public debt to GDP ratio
set as in the data.53 All other policy variables, national or supranational,
are assumed to remain constant at their 2019 values.
Modelling details are provided in Appendix D of the supplementary file.
6.2 How we work and policy scenaria
We now discuss how we work and the main policy scenaria studied. As in
the study of the debt crisis above, we work in steps.
First, employing the model used so far, we get a stationary solution using
data of the year 2019. This solution will serve as a departure point for our
new numerical simulations. Second, departing from this solution, we will
51We report that we have experimented with additional shocks and distortive effects
from covid-19, like restrictions on firms’ sales, ad hoc cuts in consumption, etc. The
economic damage becomes worse. We use a labor supply shock only because, as we shall
see, it is enough, on its own, to generate a recession of similar magnitude to that discussed
by international institutions (see e.g. European Commission (2020a, 2020b)).
52 In all scenaria studied, we assume that there is an extra lump-sum transfer to public
sector employees denoted as gcovb,t , that insulates their labor income from the pandemic.
That is, even if they are forced to work less like all other househodls, they are compensated
by a transfer, gcovb,t = (1− τyt )w
g
t (1− Φt)lb,t. Details are in Appendix D.
53That is, public debt and TARGET2 balances change places. The latter was an en-
dogenous public financing variable during 2010-2018 (see above), while, after the exit
from the economic adjustment program, and as assumed traditionally, this role is now
played by the end-of-period public debt, while, the exogenously set TARGET2 liabilities
are assumed to follow an autoregressive and state-contingent rule which means that they
fluctuate around their 2019 value. Note that state-contingency of TARGET2 liabilities to
the public debt gap is necessary for dynamic stability. Details are in Appendix D.
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modify the model as explained in the previous subsection (namely, we add
the labor supply shock, Φt, and switch public debt to the list of endogenous
variables) keeping all other driving forces (exogenous and policy variables)
at their 2019 values. This will enable us to get a measure of the economic
effects of the pandemic other things equal. As said, we will start by setting
Φt at 0.8 during 2020 and at 1 from 2021 onwards. We label this to be
our bad scenario regarding the impact of covid-19 without any government
policy reaction. Finally, as we did in our study of the debt crisis, we will
study alternative policy reactions to the pandemic crisis focusing on the
following scenaria: (I) The government, during 2020, makes a lump-sum
transfer to all households, and not only to public employees which was the
case assumed in the bad and the worse scenaria above. This transfer covers
the reduction in all labor incomes caused by the pandemic shock.54 (II) On
top of (I), during 2020 and 2021, the government also increases temporarily
by 1 percentage point all public spending items as shares to GDP apart
from public wages (the latter have remained uncut through the assumed
transfer). (III) On top of (I)-(II), from 2020 ownwards, the government also
reduces permanently the effective income and consumption tax rates, each
by one percentage point, and this extra loss in public revenue is somehow
balanced by cuts in government transfers by the same percentage point from
2021 ownwards.
Before proceeding, it is worth saying the following. We believe that,
among all the above mentioned scenaria, the possible quantitative impact
of covid-19 on the Greek economy can be better captured by scenario (III),
since the Greek government has already adopted, or has promised to adopt, a
set of policy measures which include, among others, transfers to households
and firms, increases in public spending in general and tax reductions or
discounts. Scenaria (I) and (II) however can help us to understand the
effect of one policy measure at a time.
Help from the EU In addition to the above responses, as this paper
is written, discussions take place at EU level about the establishment of
a new fund, the so-called European Recovery Fund, whose aim will be to
raise money from private markets and then allocate it to member-countries
depending on how much they have been hurt by the covid-19 pandemic (see
European Commission (2020b)). Although the relevant negotiations seem
to be still at an early stage, according to the information available so far,
Greece could benefit up to a net amount of 32 billion euros mainly in the
form of grants, if this plan is finally implemented. This amount translates
into around 17% of the Greek GDP in 2019, and should be used by the
54That is, similarly to public sector employees, we now add extra lump-sum transfers to
the income groups working in the private sector, denoted as gcovk,t and g
cov
w,t that compensate
their members for the loss of labor income due to the pandemic. That is, in equilibrium,
gcovk,t = (1− τyt )wkt (1−Φt)lk,t and gcovw,t = (1− τ
y
t )w
w
t (1−Φt)lw,t. Details are in Appendix
D.
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end of 2024. As is obvious, given that a big recession, at least in 2020, is
considered to be rather unavoidable, the effi cient use of this "manna from
heaven" money is absolutely crucial, not only as a means of reducing the
2020 output loss, but mainly as a tool of restructuring the Greek economy
in the years to come.
Therefore, in an attempt to quantify the effects of this new financial
assistance from the EU, in addition to scenaria (I)-(III), which had to do
with policy reactions at national level, we will also investigate the following
three scenaria all of which incorporate this EU assistance to our model:55 In
scenario (IV), on top of the policy measures included in scenario (III), which
will serve as the benchmark, we assume that the Greek government uses the
32 extra billion euros from the EU to finance public investment, gig,t, over
the years 2021-2014 (we assume that one fourth of the total amount is used
for this purpose each year). This can give us an idea of the potential benefits
from the the EU support when the country makes a "good" use of the money
received. In scenario (V), on top of (IV), we assume that the country also
implements stronger - and at a faster pace - reforms in the product market
so as the degree of competition in the Greek product market approaches the
one in the core eurozone countries within three years. In particular, we as-
sume that the Dixit-Stiglitz parameter of product substitutability increases
gradually from 0.775 to 0.80. This attempts to capture the contribution of
structural reforms, here in the form of stronger product market liberaliza-
tion, to economic recovery. Finally, in scenario (VI), we go to the other
extreme from (IV) and (V). Now, instead of assuming that Greece uses the
amount of 32 billion euros to finance public investment, we assume that
this amount is misused in the sense that it becomes a contestable prize and
that atomistic economic agents compete with each other for a share of this
contestable prize. We do so because there is a lot of anecdotal, as well as
econometric, evidence that, in countries with weak institutions, like Greece,
foreign aid transfers increase the size of the prize that interest groups fight
over and hence induce rent seeking activities (see Drazen (2000, chapter 12
) for a review of this literature, while see e.g. Economides et al (2008) for
empirical evidence on the impact of international aid). In turn, rent seeking
in the recipient country, and the distortion of incentives triggered by this
type of anti-social competition, mitigate the beneficial effects that foreign
aid may have in the first place. Our model of Tullock-type rent seeking
competition, as developed in section 2.1 above, can easily accommodate this
possibility; we just have to add the amount of 32 billion euros (one fourth of
it in each year from 2021 to 2024) to the contestable prize that already exists
(see equations (3b), (7b) and (10b) and the associated first-order conditions
55 In terms of modeling, we just have to add the assumed amount of financial assistance,
or foreign aid, to the budget constraint of the government and of course to the balance of
payments.
48
for rent seeking time).
6.3 Main findings
Departing from 2019, Graph 10 illustrates the simulated path of GDP when
the economy is hit by the covid-19 shock in 2020 as defined above and if
there is no policy reaction at all. In the so-called bad scenario, as said
above, Φt takes the value of 0.8 in 2020 and then returns to 1 for ever. In
this graph, we also study a worse scenario in which Φt takes the value of 0.75
in 2020, which can be thought of as the case in which there is a second wave
of the pandemic which might require a new lockdown of households/firms
(however, even in this worse scenario, Φt is assumed to return to 1 in 2021
and to remain there for ever). As can be seen in Graph 10, in the bad
scenario, the economy loses almost 12% of its output relatively to 2019,
whereas, in the worse scenario, this loss exceeds 15%. To make it worse, the
economy does not manage to rebound in the years after in the sense that
GDP remains below its 2019 level. These results show the big vulnerability
of the Greek economy to supply shocks even of relatively small magnitude.
They also imply that government intervention has been more than necessary.
Graph 10: The economic impact of covid-19 without any
response
Graph 11 presents the simulated paths of public debt to GDP under
the bad and the worse scenaria. In the bad scenario, the public debt to
GDP ratio in 2020 exceeds 225%, whereas, in the worse scenario, it jumps
to 247%. However, as said, all this is without policy reaction, which once
implemented, is expected to limit the economic downturn and the rise in
public debt. We now turn to policy reactions.
Graph 11: The public debt to GDP ratio without any response
In Graph 12, we investigate whether the various policy measures and/or
reforms, defined as scenaria (I), (II) and (III) above, can mitigate the eco-
nomic damage from covid-19. In particular, compensating all income groups
for the labor income losses they have suffered (this is scenario I) results in
an output loss of about 11% in 2020, whereas, in 2021, the output is ex-
pected to grow at a rate of about 9.9%. However, the economy cannot make
up for its output losses in the years after. If, on top of compensating all
income groups for their labor income losses, the government also increases
temporarily (for the years 2020 and 2021) all government spending items
by 1 percentage point (this is scenario II), the recession in 2020 gets milder
amounting to a drop of about 8.8% instead of 11% which was the case under
scenario I. On the other hand, again, although the economy is expected to
grow at a rate of about 8.7% in 2021, its GDP cannot return to its 2019
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level in the coming years. Putting these results together, reacting with
public spending instruments only can produce an incomplete and gradual
(U-shaped) recovery only. If, however, increases in government spending
are accompanied by permanent decreases of 1 percentage point in effective
income and consumption tax rates, which are financed by equal cuts in gov-
ernment transfers from 2021 ownwards (this is scenario III), then aggregate
things get relatively better. In this case, the GDP loss in 2020 is limited
to 8.6% and the economy is expected to grow at a rate of about 9.4% in
2021 restoring fully, even in absolute terms, its output capacity. Thus, the
tax-spending mix will be crucial to the recovery, as it was the case during
the previous, debt crisis.
Graph 12: The economic impact of covid-19 under scenaria (I),
(II) and (III)
Graph 13 presents the simulated paths of public debt to GDP under
scenaria (I), (II) and (III). For example, the adoption of policy measures,
such as the ones described in scenario (III), can limit the increase of public
debt to GDP ratio to about 213.7%, relative to about 225% in the bad
scenario discussed above, despite the increased fiscal cost associated with
the expansionary government measures; this is thanks to the lower output
loss that this scenario implies. In all cases, however, the public debt to
output ratio deescalates after the impact year as the economy rebounds,
athough at different paces depending on the scenario assumed.
Graph 13: The public debt to GDP ratio under scenaria (I), (II)
and (III)
Next, Graph 14 presents the simulated paths of output under scenaria
(IV), (V) and (VI) as defined above. In particular, under scenario (IV),
the output loss in 2020 is limited to about 6.5%; recall that, according
to this scenario, the Greek government has at its disposal extra 32 billion
euros from the EU all of which are assumed to be used to finance public
investment plans allocated equally over the years 2021-2024. Moreover, in
this scenario, in all years after 2020, the GDP is well above its pre-crisis
2019 level. In turn, if the spending and tax policy measures, included in
scenario (IV), are complemented by the implementation of stronger product
market reforms so as the associated degree of competition approaches that
in the core eurozone countries (this is scenario V), the output loss is limited
to 5.6% in 2020. and the economy enjoys even stronger growth in the years
after. Finally, the black line in Graph 13, illustrates the path of GDP
under scenario (VI) which is the "misuse" scenario. Now, as defined above,
the 32 billion package plays the role of a common pool attacked by rent
seekers. This scenario, in addition to a huge waste of resources, condemns
50
the country to economic stagnation and, in terms of GDP, it is as if the
country has received no international aid (the time path of GDP under VI
coincides with that under III).
Graph 14: The economic impact of covid-19 under scenaria (IV),
(V) and (VI)
Finally, Graph 15 presents the simulated paths of public debt to GDP
under scenaria (IV), (V) and (VI). In scenario (IV), the public debt to GDP
ratio in 2020 approaches 207%, whereas, in scenario (V), the same ratio
reaches 204%. In 2024, the public debt to output ratio falls to 168.5% under
(IV) and 166.6% under (V) respectively. In other words, economic growth
helps the country to grow out its public debt. By contrast, under the misuse
scenario (VI), public debt jumps to 212.3% and remains high in the coming
years.
Graph 15: The public debt to GDP ratio under scenaria (IV),
(V) and (VI)
The above results confirm the main message of the paper even in the
case of the new covid-19 crisis. In particular, a different spending-tax policy
mix, product market liberalizatiom and, above all, a socially productive
use of the available resources, can help the Greek economy, not only to
overcome the pandemic with the minimum possible output losses in 2020,
but also to achieve higher medium-term economic growth and a lower public
debt-to-GDP ratio over time.
7 Closing remarks, caveats and extensions
In this paper, we have provided a detailed anatomy of the Greek sovereign
debt crisis by using a medium-scale micro-founded macroeconomic model
that incorporated the key features of the Greek economy. The focus was,
not only on the role of fiscal austerity, but also on the roles of international
aid and institutional quality both of which have been closely associated with
fiscal austerity. We finally analysed the recent covid-19 pandemic crisis.
Since the main results have already been stated in the Introduction, we
close with a discussion of some key assumptions, caveats of the model and
possible extensions. Here, we modeled, and also measured, institutional
quality in a specific way. We assumed that firms can keep a fraction of
their output only, with the rest being taken away by rent-seekers, where
this fraction was set according to an index measuring the enforcement of
property rights. This index, as already said, reflects both hard data on
core institutional fundamentals (the rule of law, regulatory quality, violence
and political stability, etc) and perceptions (where the latter were, most
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probably, also influenced by the fear of sovereign default or the so-called fear
of Grexit). An extension could be to model, and measure, separately the
effects of the country risk (expectations of exit from the Eurozone as in e.g.
Kriwoluzky et al. (2019) or model uncertainty and worst-case scenaria as in
Hansen and Sargent (2008)) and the effects of changes in core institutional
fundamentals. Ideally, one should endogenize both of them; see e.g. Corsetti
et al. (2013) for a model of the ex ante sovereign default probability, while
see e.g. Besley and Persson (2009) for a model of endogenous institutional
quality, where the latter is shaped by current choices as well as by past
investments in state capacity. Another interesting extension could be to
add a core creditor country like Germany, so as to have a closed general
equibrium system of the EZ. This would enable us to examine how financial
aid given to one country affects the other country and, in particular, how
the various fiscal and monetary bailouts provided to Greece have affected
the core of the EZ (see e.g. Philippopoulos et al. (2017b) for a related
two-region model). We leave these extensions for future work.
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Tables, figures and graphs
Table 1
Baseline parameterization
Parameter Description Value
ν home goods bias in consumption 0.5
µ1 weight of consumption in utility 0.4
µ2 weight of leisure in utility 0.55
µ3 weight of money balances in utility 0.03
β savers’time discount factor 0.99
βk borrowers’time discount factor 0.98
δ depreciation rate of private capital 0.05
δg depreciation rate of public capital 0.05
ψp transaction cost in foreign capital market (private) 0.5
ψg transaction cost in foreign capital market (public) 0.5
Ap TFP in private sector’s production function 1
Ag TFP in public sector’s production function 1
Ak entrepreneurs’labour productivity 3
Aw workers’labour productivity 2
1− α share of labor in private production 0.6
σ contribution of public output to private production 0.1
θ1 share of capital and imported goods in public production 0.3045
θ2 share of labor in public production 0.6
χp intensity of private capital relative to imported goods (private) 0.5
op substitutability between capital and imported goods (private) 0.5
χg intensity of public capital relative to imported goods (public) 0.5
og substitutability between capital and imported goods (public) 0.5
ξk capital adjustment cost parameter 0.3
ξl transaction cost associated with bank loans to firms 0.3
ξz transaction cost associated with NCB loans to banks 0.3
ξb transaction cost associated with bonds held by banks 0
γ measure of diminishing returns in anti-social activities 0.5
ψ∗ country’s interest-rate premium parameter 0.05
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Table 1 continued
Baseline parameterization
Parameter Description Value
d threshold value of public debt to ouput 1.1
Γk effi ciency of entrepreneurs’anti-social activity 1
Γw effi ciency of workers’anti-social activity 0.7
Γb effi ciency of public employees’anti-social activity 1.3
Θ constant in the function of exports 0.5
ϑ Cobb-Douglas exponent in the function of exports 2
f threshold value of external debt to output 0.8
i∗ constant term of world interest rate 0.01
θ substitutability between intermediate goods 0.75
ξp price adjustment cost parameter (Rotemberg) 3
ρl fraction in firms’borrowing constraint 0.5
ρz fraction in banks’borrowing constraint 0.5
nk share of capitalists in population 0.2
nw share of workers in population 0.6
nb share of public employees in population (data) 0.2
Table 2
Greek public debt to GDP and its main holders
Year Total public debt λeu λg
(% of GDP) (% of total (% of total
public debt) public debt)
2008 109.4 0 75
2009 126.7 0 75
2010 146.2 9.3 46.3
2011 172.1 19.9 24.7
2012 159.6 59.9 20.3
2013 177.4 66.3 18.2
2014 178.9 67.2 16.9
2015 175.9 68.6 16.1
2016 178.5 69.8 16.0
2017 176.2 70.9 16.0
2018 181.2 70.9 16.0
2019 176.7 70.9 16.0
Source: Public Debt Management Agency and Greek Ministry of Finance.
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Table 3a
Bank of Greece’s assets
(billions of euros, end of year)
Year Lending to Securities Government long-term Total assets
banks debt
2007 9 10 8 42
2008 38 14 8 71
2009 50 21 7 86
2010 98 24 7 13
2011 128 21 7 168
2012 121 21 6 160
2013 73 21 6 109
2014 56 31 5 103
2015 107 40 5 163
2016 67 57 6 142
2017 34 74 6 125
2018 11 76 5 109
2019 8 75 5 109
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table 3b
Bank of Greece’s liabilities
(billions of euros, end of year)
Year Banknotes TARGET2 Reserves Government Total
deposits liabilities
2007 16 10 7 1 42
2008 18 35 8 1 71
2009 21 49 8 1 86
2010 22 87 10 2 138
2011 23 105 5 5 168
2012 23 98 2 7 160
2013 25 51 2 8 109
2014 27 49 3 5 103
2015 29 94 1 5 163
2016 30 72 1 9 142
2017 31 59 2 12 125
2018 33 29 7 25 109
2019 30 26 9 27 109
Source: Bank of Greece.
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Table 4a
Government revenue and expenditure
Variable (% of GDP) 2008 2010 2011 2014 2016 2018 2019
Revenue 40 41 44 47 49 48 47
Expenditure 50 53 54 51 49 48 46
Source: European Commission (Report on Public Finances in EMU).
Table 4b
Fiscal (spending-tax) policy variables
Variable sg sw si str τy τ c
Year (% GDP) (% GDP) (% GDP) (% GDP) (effect.) (effect.)
2008 9.1 11.6 5.8 18.9 27.3 16.8
2009 10.2 13.1 5.7 20.6 27.1 15.2
2010 9.8 12.4 3.7 20.9 27.6 17.6
2011 9.1 12.6 2.5 22.9 29.8 19.0
2012 9.0 12.8 2.5 23.2 33.6 18.5
2013 8.4 12.1 3.4 21.4 32.3 18.7
2014 8.2 12.2 3.7 21.8 33.4 19.1
2015 8.2 12.1 3.8 22.0 34.4 19.4
2016 8.1 12.1 3.5 22.1 35. 21.5
2017 8.2 11.9 4.4 21.3 36.0 21.3
2018 7.3 11.8 3.0 20.7 35.4 22.5
2019 7.7 11.7 2.2 20.7 NA NA
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
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Table 5a
Main variables in the solution for the year 2008
Variable Description Model solution Data
c/y Consumption to ouput 85.6% 67.4%
inv/y Investment to output 19% 23.8%
f/y Foreign debt to output 82.1% 76%
Source: Eurostat.
Table 5b
Other variables in the solution for the year 2008
Variable Descritpion Value
ck consumption of entrepreneur 0.306
cw consumption of private worker 0.16
cb consumption of public employee 0.253
lk work hours of entrepreneur 0.02
lw work hours of private worker 0.20
lb work hours of public employee 0.175
TT terms of trade 0.31
y per capita real output 0.243
sk capitalist’s effort time allocated 0.085
to anti-social activities
sw worker’s effort time allocated to anti- 0.093
social activities
sb public employee’s effort time allocated to anti- 0.126
social activities
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Figure 1a
Property rights in Greece
Source: World Governance Indicators.
Figure 1b
Rule of law, comparison to other countries
Source: World Governance Indicators.
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Figure 1c
Regulatory quality, comparison to other countries
Source: World Governance Indicators.
Figure 1d
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism,
comparison to other countries
Source: World Governance Indicators.
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Graph 1
Output loss and data
Source: Eurostat.
Graph 2
Output loss and its main drivers
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Graph 3
Distributional effects
Graph 4
No fiscal bailout
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Graph 5
Less fiscal austerity - lower taxes
Graph 6
Less fiscal austerity - higher spending
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Graph 7
Alternative fiscal mixes
Graph 8
Stronger product market liberalization
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Graph 9
Putting counterfactuals together
Graph 10
The economic impact of covid-19 without any response
72
Graph 11
The public debt to output ratio without any response
Graph 12
The economic impact of covid-19
under scenaria (I), (II) and (III)
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Graph 13
The public debt to output ratio
under scenaria (I), (II) and (III)
Graph 14
The economic impact of covid-19
under scenaria (IV), (V) and (VI)
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Graph 15
The public debt to output ratio
under scenaria (IV), (V) and (VI)
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Appendices
Appendix A: Economic agents
Appendix A provides the first-order conditions of households, private firms and
private banks.
A.1 Solution of the capital owner’s problem
Each k acts competitively choosing {chk,t, c
f
k,t, ck,t, lk,t, sk,t, Rk,t, fk,t, hk,t}∞t=0.
The first-order conditions include the definition in (2), the constraints in (3a-3b)
in the main text and also:
µ2
(1− lk,t − sk,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )w
k
t
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
(A1a)
µ2
(1− lk,t − sk,t)
=
(
µ1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
) γΓk(sk,t)γ−1(1− PRt)phtpt nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ

(A1b)
qt
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
= βk(qt+1 + π
i
k,t) (A1c)
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
etp
∗
t
pt
=
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
etp
∗
t
pt
×
×ψp
 etp∗tpt (Nkt fk,t + F gt )
pht
pt
Yt
− f
+ βk et+1p∗t+1pt+1 (1 + i∗t+1) p
∗
t
p∗t+1
(A1d)
chk,t
cfk,t
=
ν
(1− ν)
pft
pht
(A1e)
µ3
hk,t
+ βk
1
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
pt
pt+1
=
1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
(A1f)
It also follows from the above equations that the CPI is:
pt = (p
h
t )
ν(pft )
1−ν (A1g)
A.2 Solution of the worker’s problem
Each w acts competitively choosing {chw,t, c
f
w,t, cw,t, lw,t, sw,t, jw,t, hw,t}∞t=0.
The first-order conditions include the definition in (6), the constraints in (7a-7b)
in the main text and also:
µ2
(1− lw,t − sw,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )w
w
t
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
(A2a)
2
chw,t
cfw,t
=
ν
(1− ν)
pft
pht
(A2b)
µ3
hw,t
+ β
1
(1 + τ ct+1)cw,t+1
pt
pt+1
=
1
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
(A2c)
µ2
(1− lw,t − sw,t)
=
(
µ1
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
) γΓw(sw,t)γ−1(1− PRt)phtpt nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ

(A2d)
(1 + τ ct+1)cw,t+1
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
= β(1 + idt+1)
pt
pt+1
(A2e)
A.3 Solution of the public employee’s problem
Each b acts competitively choosing {chb,t, c
f
b,t, cb,t, lb,t, sb,t, jb,t, hb,t}∞t=0. The
first-order conditions include the definition in (9), the constraints in (10a-10b)
in the main text and also:
µ2
(1− lb,t − sb,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )w
g
t
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
(A3a)
µ2
(1− lb,t − sb,t)
=
(
µ1
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
) γΓb(sb,t)γ−1(1− PRt)phtpt nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ

(A3b)
chb,t
cfb,t
=
ν
(1− ν)
pft
pht
(A3c)
µ3
hb,t
+ β
1
(1 + τ ct+1)cb,t+1
pt
pt+1
=
1
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
(A3d)
(1 + τ ct+1)cb,t+1
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
= β(1 + idt+1)
pt
pt+1
(A3e)
A.4 Solution of the final good firm’s problem
Each final good firm acts competitively. The first-order condition for yhi,t gives
the demand function:
phi,t = p
h
t
(
yhi,t
yhh,t
)θ−1
(A4a)
which in turn implies from the zero-profit condition:
pht =
 Ni∑
i=1
1
N i
(phi,t)
θ
θ−1

θ−1
θ
(A4b)
Note that, in a symmetric equilibrium, yhh,t = y
h
i,t and p
h
t = p
h
i,t.
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A.5 Solution of the intermediate goods firm’s problem
The firm maximizes its stream of dividends defined in (14) and (17), subject
to the production function in (15), the borrowing constraint in (16) and the
inverse demand function coming from the final good firm’s problem in (A4a).
The first-order conditions for {lwi,t, lki,t, m
f
i,t, ki,t, Li,t}∞t=0 are respectively:
(1− τπt )wwt = [(1− τπt )PRtθ
pht
pt
− p
h
t
pt
ξp
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)
pht
pht−1
(θ − 1)yhi,t
yhi,t
+
+βi,t
pht+1
pt+1
ξp
(
pht+1
pht
− 1
)
pht+1
pht
(θ − 1)yhi,t+1
yhi,t
]
(1− σ)(1− α)Awyhi,t
(Aklki,t +A
wlwi,t)
(A5a)
(1− τπt )wkt = [(1− τπt )PRtθ
pht
pt
− p
h
t
pt
ξp
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)
pht
pht−1
(θ − 1)yhi,t
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+
+βi,t
pht+1
pt+1
ξp
(
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− 1
)
pht+1
pht
(θ − 1)yhi,t+1
yhi,t
]
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(Aklki,t +A
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(A5b)
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pht
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f
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(A5c)
pht
pt
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(A5d)
1 = βi,t(1 + i
l
t+1)
pt
pt+1
+Ni,t (A5e)
and we also have the complementary slackness condition on the borrowing con-
straint (16):
Ni,t
(
Li,t − ρl
pht
pt
ki,t−1
)
= 0 (A5f)
where Ni,t is the multiplier associated with (16) and we define rkt+1 ≡
∂yhi,t+1
∂kk,t
=
(1−σ)αyhi,t+1χ
p(kk,t)
op−1
[χp(ki,t)op+(1−χp)(mfi,t+1)op]
. Also, βi,t ≡
βk(1+τ
c
t)ck,t
(1+τct+1)ck,t+1
. Notice that the Euler
4
equation for bank loans, jointly with the Euler equation for bank deposits in
the savers’problem, reveals that ilt+1 can differ from i
d
t+1, which is helpful in
the private banks’optimization problem that follows below.are respectively:
A.6 Solution of the private bank’s problem
Working as in Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011), we set in each time period:
(1 + idt )
pt−1
pt
jp,t−1 + (1 + i
z
t )
pt−1
pt
zp,t−1 = (1 + i
l
t)
pt−1
pt
Lp,t−1 + (1 + i
∗
t )
pt−1
pt
bp,t−1
(A6a)
so that by leading it one period forward we have for the issuance of deposits at
time t:
jp,t =
(1 + ilt+1)
pt
pt+1
Lp,t + (1 + i
∗
t+1)
pt
pt+1
bp,t − (1 + izt+1) ptpt+1 zp,t
(1 + idt+1)
pt
pt+1
(A6b)
Using (A6a) into (19), the private bank solves a static problem in each period
by maximizing:
πp,t ≡ jp,t + zp,t − Lp,t − bp,t −
pht
pt
Ξ(Lp,t, zp,t, bp,t) (A6c)
subject to the borrowing constraint in (20).
The optimality conditions forLp,t and zp,t are respectively:
pht
pt
ξlLi,t =
(1 + ilt+1)
(1 + idt+1)
− 1 +Np,tρp (A6d)
pht
pt
ξzzp,t = 1−
(1 + izt+1)
(1 + idt+1)
−Np,t (A6e)
and we also have the complementary slackness condition on the borrowing con-
straint (20):
Np,t (zp,t − ρz(Lp,t + bp,t)) = 0 (A6f)
where Np,t is the multiplier associated with the constraint in (20).
Notice that these are well-defined supply and demand functions. Also notice,
as we have pointed out in the main text, that we could also derive the optimal
demand for government bonds. However, instead of choosing bp,t, we prefer to
simply set it (namely, the fraction of Greek public debt purchased by private
domestic banks) exogenously as in the data.
A.7 Households’net incomes
Capital owner’s net income:
ynetk,t ≡ (1− τ
y
t )w
k
t lk,t + (qt + π
i
k,t)Rk,t−1 + π
p
k,t
5
+
etp
∗
t
pt
fk,t +
pt−1
pt
hk,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γk(sk,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt−
−τ ct
(
pht
pt
chk,t +
pft
pt
cfk,t
)
(A7a)
Worker’s net income:
ynetw,t ≡ (1− τ
y
t )w
w
t lw,t + (1 + i
d
t )
pt−1
pt
jw,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hw,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γw(sw,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt−
−τ ct
(
pht
pt
chw,t +
pft
pt
cfw,t
)
(A7b)
Public sector employee’s net income:
ynetb,t ≡ (1− τ
y
t )w
g
t lb,t + (1 + i
d
t )
pt−1
pt
jb,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hb,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γb(sb,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt−
−τ ct
(
pht
pt
chb,t +
pft
pt
cfb,t
)
(A7c)
Appendix B: Market-clearing conditions
Recall first the definitions of populations and their fractions. That is, Nk +
Nw + N b = N , nk = N
k
N , n
b = N
b
N , n
w = N
b
N = 1 − n
k − nb. Recall also that
we have assumed for notational simplicity Nk = Nh = N i = Np and N b = Ng.
Then, we have the following market-clearing conditions:
In the markets for dividends and shares:
Nkπik,t = N
iπi,t = N
kπi,t (B1a)
Nkπpk,t = N
pπp,t = N
kπp,t (B1b)
NkRk,t = N
iRi,t = N
kRi,t (B1c)
In the labor market for managerial services:
Nklk,t = N
ilki,t = N
klki,t (B2)
6
In the labor market for public employees:
N blb,t = N
glg,t = N
blg,t (B3)
In the labor market for private workers:
Nwlw,t = N
ilwi,t = N
klwi,t (B4)
In the bank deposit market:
Npjp,t = N
kjp,t = N
wjw,t +N
bjb,t (B5)
In the market for bank loans:
NpLp,t = N
kLp,t = N
kLi,t (B6)
Regarding sovereign bonds purchased by domestic private agents/banks (ex-
pressed in population shares):
nkbp,t ≡ bdt = λdt dt (B7)
In the money market (expressed in population shares):
hnt = n
khk,t + n
whw,t + n
bhb,t (B8)
In the market for the domestically produced good (expressed in population
shares):
nkyhi,t = n
kchk,t + n
wchw,t + n
bchb,t + n
kxk,t + n
b(ggg,t + g
i
g,t) + c
f∗
t +
+nk
ξk
2
(
kk,t
kk,t−1
− 1
)2
kk,t−1 + n
k ξ
p
2
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)2
yhi,t+
+nk
(
ξl
2
(Li,t)
2 +
ξz
2
(zp,t)
2 +
ξb
2
(bk,t)
−2
)
(B9)
where cf∗t denotes per capita exports to the rest of the world. Since in a small
open economy this is an exogenous variable, we assume, following e.g. Lorenzoni
(2014, p. 698), that cf∗t = Θ
(
pht
pft
)−ϑ
, where Θ, ϑ > 0 are parameters.
Appendix C: Macroeconomic system
Collecting all equations, the macroeconomic system that we solve numerically
consists of the following equations:
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Capital owner
ck,t =
(chk,t)
ν(cfk,t)
1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (S1)
µ2
(1− lk,t − sk,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )w
k
t
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
(S2)
µ2
(1− lk,t − sk,t)
=
(
µ1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
) γΓk(sk,t)γ−1(1− PRt)phtpt nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ

(S3)
qt
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
= βk(qt+1 + πi,t) (S4)
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
etp
∗
t
pt
=
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
etp
∗
t
pt
×
×ψp
 etp∗tpt (nkt f tk + λgt dt)
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− f
+ βk et+1p∗t+1pt+1 (1 + i∗t+1) p
∗
t
p∗t+1
(S5)
chk,t
cfk,t
=
ν
(1− ν)
pft
pht
(S6)
µ3
hk,t
+ βk
1
(1 + τ ct+1)ck,t+1
pt
pt+1
=
1
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
(S7)
Worker
cw,t =
(chw,t)
ν(cfw,t)
1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (S8)
(1 + τ ct)
(
pht
pt
chw,t +
pft
pt
cfw,t
)
+ jw,t + hw,t ≡
≡ (1− τyt )wwt lw,t + (1 + idt )
pt−1
pt
jw,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hw,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
Γw(sw,t)
γ(1− PRt)p
h
t
pt
nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ
(S9)
µ2
(1− lw,t − sw,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )w
w
t
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
(S10)
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µ2
(1− lw,t − sw,t)
=
(
µ1
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
) γΓw(sw,t)γ−1(1− PRt)phtpt nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ

(S11)
chw,t
cfw,t
=
ν
(1− ν)
pft
pht
(S12)
µ3
hw,t
+ β
1
(1 + τ ct+1)cw,t+1
pt
pt+1
=
1
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
(S13)
(1 + τ ct+1)cw,t+1
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
= β(1 + idt+1)
pt
pt+1
(S14)
Public employee
cb,t =
(chb,t)
ν(cfb,t)
1−ν
νν(1− ν)1−ν (S15)
(1 + τ ct)
(
pht
pt
chb,t +
pft
pt
cfb,t
)
+ jb,t + hb,t =
= (1− τyt )w
g
t lb,t + (1 + i
d
t )
pt−1
pt
jb,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hb,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
Γb(sb,t)
γ(1− PRt)p
h
t
pt
nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ
(S16)
µ2
(1− lb,t − sb,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )w
g
t
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
(S17)
µ2
(1− lb,t − sb,t)
=
(
µ1
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
) γΓb(sb,t)γ−1(1− PRt)phtpt nkyhi,t
nkΓk(sk,t)γ + nwΓw(sw,t)γ + nbΓb(sb,t)γ

(S18)
chb,t
cfb,t
=
ν
(1− ν)
pft
pht
(S19)
µ3
hb,t
+ β
1
(1 + τ ct+1)cb,t+1
pt
pt+1
=
1
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
(S20)
and (instead of having a second Euler equation for bank deposits similar to
(S.14) that would create indeterminacy problems in steady state) we set:
jb,t ≡ nkjp,t (S21)
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Price indexes
pt = (p
h
t )
ν(pft )
1−ν (S22)
pft = etp
h∗
t (S23)
Private (intermediate goods) firms
yhi,t = A
p
(
ngygg,t
nk
)σ [(
χp(ki,t−1)
op + (1− χp)(mfi,t)op
) α
op
(
Aklk,t +A
w n
w,e
t n
wlw,t
nk
)1−α]1−σ
(S24)
(1− τπt )wwt = [(1− τπt )PRtθ
pht
pt
− p
h
t
pt
ξp
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)
pht
pht−1
(θ − 1)+
+βi,t
pht+1
pt+1
ξp
(
pht+1
pht
− 1
)
pht+1
pht
(θ − 1)yhi,t+1
yhi,t
]
(1− σ)(1− α)Awyhi,t
(Aklk,t +Aw
nw,et n
wlw,t
nk
)
(S25)
(1− τπt )wkt = [(1− τπt )PRtθ
pht
pt
− p
h
t
pt
ξp
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)
pht
pht−1
(θ − 1)+
+βi,t
pht+1
pt+1
ξp
(
pht+1
pht
− 1
)
pht+1
pht
(θ − 1)yhi,t+1
yhi,t
]
(1− σ)(1− α)Akyhi,t
(Aklk,t +Aw
nw,et n
wlw,t
nk
)
(S26)
pht
pt
[
1 + ξk
(
ki,t
ki,t−1
− 1
)]
= βi,t
pht+1
pt+1
[1− δ + (1− τπt+1)PRt+1θrkt+1−
−ξ
k
2
(
ki,t+1
ki,t
− 1
)2
+ ξk
(
ki,t+1
ki,t
− 1
)
ki,t+1
ki,t
]−
−βi,t
pht+1
pt+1
ξp
(
pht+1
pht
− 1
)
pht+1
pht
(θ − 1)rkt+1+
+βi,t+1
pht+2
pt+2
ξp
(
pht+2
pht+1
− 1
)
pht+2
pht+1
(θ − 1)rkt+1 +Ni,tρl
pht
pt
(S27)
(1− τπt )
pft
pt
= [(1− τπt )PRtθ
pht
pt
− p
h
t
pt
ξp
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)
pht
pht−1
(θ − 1)+
+βi,t
pht+1
pt+1
ξp
(
pht+1
pht
− 1
)
pht+1
pht
(θ − 1)yhi,t+1
yhi,t
]
(1− σ)αyhi,t(1− χp)(m
f
i,t)
op−1[
χp(ki,t−1)op + (1− χp)(mfi,t)op
]
(S28)
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kk,t = (1− δ)kk,t−1 + xk,t (S29)
πi,t ≡ (1− τπt )
[
PRt
pht
pt
yhi,t − wwt
nw,et n
w
nk
lw,t − wkt lk,t −
pft
pt
mfi,t
]
−
−p
h
t
pt
[kk,t − (1− δ)kk,t−1]−
pht
pt
ξk
2
(
kk,t
kk,t−1
− 1
)2
kk,t−1−
pht
pt
ξp
2
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)2
yhi,t+
+
(
Li,t − (1 + ilt)
pt−1
pt
Li,t−1
)
(S30)
1 = βi,t(1 + i
l
t+1)
pt
pt+1
+Ni,t (S31)
Ni,t
(
Li,t − ρl
pht
pt
ki,t
)
= 0 (S32)
where we use rkt+1 ≡
∂yhi,t+1
∂kk,t
=
(1−σ)αyhi,t+1χ
p(kk,t)
op−1
[χp(ki,t)op+(1−χp)(mfi,t+1)op]
, βi,t ≡
βk(1+τ
c
t)ck,t
(1+τct+1)ck,t+1
and βi,t+1 ≡
(βk)
2(1+τct+1)ck,t+1
(1+τct+2)ck,t+2
.
Private banks
πp,t ≡ jp,t + zp,t − Li,t − bk,t −
pht
pt
(
ξl
2
(Li,t)
2 +
ξz
2
(zp,t)
2 +
ξb
2
(bk,t)
−2
)
(S33)
jp,t =
(1 + ilt+1)
pt
pt+1
Li,t + (1 + i
∗
t+1)
pt
pt+1
bk,t − (1 + izt+1) ptpt+1 zp,t
(1 + idt+1)
pt
pt+1
(S34)
pht
pt
ξlLi,t =
(1 + ilt+1)
(1 + idt+1)
− 1 +Np,tρp (S35)
pht
pt
ξzzp,t = 1−
(1 + izt+1)
(1 + idt+1)
−Np,t (S36)
Np,t
(
zp,t−ρz(Lp,t+bp,t)
)
= 0 (S37)
where:
nkjp,t = n
wjw,t + n
bjb,t (S38)
and where we use nkbk,t = npbp,t = bdt = λ
d
t dt = (1− λncbt − λ
g
t − λeut )dt at each
t.
State firms
ygg,t = A
g
(
χg(kgg,t−1)
og + (1− χg)(mgg,t)og
) θ1
og (lb,t)
θ2
(
ggg,t
)1−θ1−θ2 (S39)
kgg,t = (1− δg)k
g
g,t−1 + g
i
g,t (S40)
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Consolidated government budget constraint
gtrt + (1 + i
∗
t )
pt−1
pt
(1− λncbt−1 − λ
g
t−1 − λ
eu
t−1)dt−1+
+(1 + i∗t )
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λgt−1dt−1 + (1 + i
∗)
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λeut−1dt−1+
+nb
[
wgt l
g
g,t +
pht
pt
(
ggg,t + g
i
g,t
)
+
pft
pt
mgg,t
]
+
+
pht
pt
ψg
2
 etp∗tpt (nkfk,t + λgt dt)
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− f
2 nkyhi,t = (1− λncbt )dt + TtN +
+nkhk,t + n
whw,t + n
bhb,t −
pt−1
pt
(nkhk,t−1 + n
whw,t−1 + n
bhb,t−1)−
−nk
(
zp,t −
Pt−1
Pt
zp,t−1
)
+
(
t argt−
Pt−1
Pt
t argt−1
)
(S41)
where we use nkbk,t = bdt = λ
d
t dt = (1− λncbt − λ
g
t − λeut )dt at each t.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) identity
nkyhi,t = n
kchk,t + n
wchw,t + n
bchb,t + n
kxk,t + n
b(ggg,t + g
i
g,t) + c
f∗
t +
+nk
ξk
2
(
kk,t
kk,t−1
− 1
)2
kk,t−1 + n
k ξ
p
2
(
pht
pht−1
− 1
)2
yhi,t+
+nk
(
ξl
2
(Li,t)
2 +
ξz
2
(zp,t)
2 +
ξb
2
(bk,t)
−2
)
(S42)
where cf∗t is exports to the rest of the world (defined below).
Balance of payments (economy’s resource constraint)
pft
pt
(
nkcfk,t + n
wcfw,t + n
bcfb,t + n
kmfi,t + n
bmgg,t
)
− p
h
t
pt
cf∗t +
+(1 + i∗t )
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
nkfk,t−1+
+(1 + i∗t )
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λgt−1dt−1+
+(1 + i∗)
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λeut−1dt−1+
12
+
pht
pt
ψp
2
 etp∗tpt (nkfk,t + λgt dt)
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− f
2 nkyhi,t+
+
pht
pt
ψg
2
 etp∗tpt (nkfk,t + λgt dt)
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− f
2 nkyhi,t =
=
etp
∗
t
pt
nkfk,t + λ
g
t dt + λ
eu
t dt +
(
t argt−
Pt−1
Pt
t argt−1
)
(S43)
Tax revenues
Tt
N
≡ τ ct [nk(
pht
pt
chk,t +
pft
pt
cfk,t) + n
w(
pht
pt
chw,t +
pft
pt
cfw,t)+
+nb(
pht
pt
chb,t +
pft
pt
cfb,t)] + τ
y
tn
kwkt lk,t + τ
y
tn
w,e
t n
wwwt lw,t+
+τytn
bwgt lb,t + τ
π
t n
k
[
PRt
pht
pt
yhi,t − wwt
nw,et n
w
nk
lw,t − wkt lk,t −
pft
pt
mfi,t
]
(S44)
Exports
cf∗t = Θ
(
pht
pft
)−ϑ
(S45)
Public spending ratios
wgt =
swt
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
nblb,t
(S46)
ggg,t =
sgtn
kyhi,t
nb
(S47)
gig,t =
sitn
kyhi,t
nb
(S48)
gtrt = s
tr
t
pht
pt
nkyhi,t (S49)
mgg,t =
pht
pft
smt n
kyhi,t
nb
(S50)
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Country’s interest rate
i∗t = i
∗ + ψi
exp( dt
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− d)− 1
 (S51)
We therefore have a dynamic system of 51 equations, (S1)-(S51), in 51 vari-
ables. The latter are the paths of {ck,t, chk,t, c
f
k,t}∞t=0, {cw,t, chw,t, c
f
w,t}∞t=0,
{cb,t, chb,t, c
f
b,t}∞t=0, {lk,t, lw,t, lb,t}
∞
t=0, {hk,t, hw,t, hbt}
∞
t=0, {sk,t, sw,t, sbt}
∞
t=0,
{fk,t, jw,t, jbt}∞t=0, {yhi,t, kk,t, xk,t, m
f
i,t, πi,t, w
k
t , w
w
t , Li,t, Ni,t}∞t=0, {πp,t, jp,t,
zp,t, Np,t}∞t=0,
{
ygg,t, k
g
g,t
}∞
t=0
, {pt, pht , p
f
t , i
d
t , i
l
t, i
∗
t , qt}∞t=0,
{
wgt , g
g
g,t, g
i
g,t, g
tr
t , m
g
g,t
}∞
t=0
,
{targt}∞t=0, {
Tt
N }
∞
t=0, {c
f∗
t }∞t=0. This is given the paths of the exogenously set
policy variables, {τ ct , τ
y
t , τ
π
t , s
w
t , s
g
t , s
i
t, s
tr
t , s
m
t }∞t=0, {λ
g
t , λ
eu
t , λ
ncb
t ,
dt
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
,
izt }∞t=0, the path of the degree of property rights, {PRt}∞t=0, and world prices
{ph∗t , p
f∗
t , p
∗
t }∞t=0. The data used for the specification of the time-paths of the
exogenously set policy instruments and the index of property rights used in the
solutions are described in subsection 3.2 in the main text.
Transformed variables
For convenience, we re-express some variables. We define p
f
t
pht
≡ TTt to be
the terms of trade (an increase means an improvement in competitiveness vis-
à-vis the rest of the world). Then, we have p
h
t
pt
= (TTt)
ν−1, p
f
t
pt
= (TTt)
ν ,
etp
∗
t
pt
= (TTt)
2ν−1, Πt ≡ ptpt−1 = Π
h
t
(
TTt
TTt−1
)1−ν
and TTtTTt−1 =
et
et−1
Πh∗t
Πht
, where
Πht ≡
pht
pht−1
. Also, etet−1 is the gross exchange rate depreciation which is set at
one all the time. Hence, in the final system, we have Πt = Πht
(
TTt
TTt−1
)1−ν
and
TTt
TTt−1
= etet−1
Πh∗t
Πht
and, in all other equations, we use the transformations p
h
t
pt
=
(TTt)
ν−1, p
f
t
pt
= (TTt)
ν , etp
∗
t
pt
= (TTt)
2ν−1. In other words, regarding prices,
instead of {pt, pht , p
f
t }∞t=0, now the endogenous variables are
{
TTt, Πht , Πt
}∞
t=0
.
Recall that, in a small open economy, Πh∗t ≡
ph∗t
ph∗t−1
is exogenous (we set it at 1
all the time), while Π∗t ≡
p∗t
p∗t−1
can also be treated for simplicity as exogenous
(we set it at 1 all the time) or, more generally, if we use p∗t = (p
h∗
t )
ν(pf∗t )
1−ν , it
can be written as Π∗t ≡
p∗t
p∗t−1
= (Πh∗t )
ν
(
Πht
)1−ν
(where we have set etet−1 = 1); in
our solutions, we simply set Π∗t ≡
p∗t
p∗t−1
= 1 all the time.
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Appendix D: Modelling the economic impact of covid-19
This appendix presents what changes in the above model as a result of covid-19.
The changes have been discussed informally in the main text.
Given the labor supply shock, the budget constraints of the three types of
households change to:
(1 + τ ct)
(
pht
pt
chk,t +
pft
pt
cfk,t
)
+ (1 + i∗t )
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
fk,t−1+
+qtRk,t +
pht
pt
ψp(.) + hk,t ≡
≡ (1− τyt )wkt Φtlk,t + gcovk,t + (qt + πik,t)Rk,t−1 + π
p
k,t
+
etp
∗
t
pt
fk,t +
pt−1
pt
hk,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γk(sk,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt (D1a)
(1 + τ ct)
(
pht
pt
chw,t +
pft
pt
cfw,t
)
+ jw,t + hw,t ≡
≡ (1− τyt )wwt Φtlw,t + gcovw,t + (1 + idt )
pt−1
pt
jw,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hw,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γw(sw,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt (D1b)
(1 + τ ct)
(
pht
pt
chb,t +
pft
pt
cfb,t
)
+ jb,t + hb,t ≡
≡ (1− τyt )w
g
tΦtlb,t + g
cov
b,t + (1 + i
d
t )
pt−1
pt
jb,t−1 +
pt−1
pt
hb,t−1 + g
tr
t +
+
(
Γb(sb,t)
γ
NkΓk(sk,t)γ +NwΓw(sw,t)γ +N bΓb(sb,t)γ
)
(1− PRt)Yt (D1c)
where 0 < Φt < 1 quantifies the impact of covid-19 on labour supply and gcovk,t ,
gcovw,t , g
cov
b,t represent the transfers made by the government to capital owners,
private workers and public sector employees respectively. In equilibrium, we
assume that gcovk,t = (1 − τ
y
t )w
k
t (1 − Φt)lk,t, gcovw,t = (1 − τ
y
t )w
w
t (1 − Φt)lw,t and
gcovb,t = (1 − τ
y
t )w
g
t (1 − Φt)lb,t. This implies that the government compensates
the various households for their income losses due to covid-19.
In turn, the first-order conditions with respect to labour supply become:
µ2
(1− lk,t − sk,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )Φtw
k
t
(1 + τ ct)ck,t
(D2a)
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µ2
(1− lw,t − sw,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )Φtw
w
t
(1 + τ ct)cw,t
(D2b)
µ2
(1− lb,t − sb,t)
=
µ1(1− τ
y
t )Φtw
g
t
(1 + τ ct)cb,t
(D2c)
The market-clearing conditions in the three labour markets become:
NkΦtlk,t = N
ilki,t = N
klki,t (D3a)
NwΦtlw,t = N
ilwi,t = N
klwi,t (D3b)
N bΦtlb,t = N
glg,t = N
blg,t (D3c)
The tax revenue function and the consolidated government budget constraint
change to:
Tt ≡ τ ct [Nk(
pht
pt
chk,t +
pft
pt
cfk,t) +N
w(
pht
pt
chw,t +
pft
pt
cfw,t)+
+N b(
pht
pt
chb,t +
pft
pt
cfb,t)] + τ
y
tN
k[
pht
pt
rkt kk,t−1 + πk,t + w
k
t Φtlk,t]
+τytN
wwwt Φtlw,t + τ
y
tN
bwgtΦtlb,t (D4)
gtrt + n
kgcovk,t + n
wgcovw,t + n
bgcovb,t + (1 + i
∗
t )
pt−1
pt
λdt−1dt−1+
+(1 + i∗t )
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λgt−1dt−1+
+(1 + i∗)
p∗t−1
p∗t
etp
∗
t
pt
pt−1
et−1p∗t−1
λeut−1dt−1+
+nb
[
wgt l
g
g,t +
pht
pt
(
ggg,t + g
i
g,t
)
+
pft
pt
mgg,t
]
+
+
pht
pt
ψg
2
 etp∗tpt (nkfk,t + λgt dt)
pht
pt
nkyhi,t
− f
2 nkyhi,t = (λdt + λgt + λeut )dt + TtN +
+nkhk,t + n
whw,t + n
bhb,t −
pt−1
pt
(nkhk,t−1 + n
whw,t−1 + n
bhb,t−1)−
−nk
(
zp,t − (1 + izt )
pt−1
pt
zp,t−1
)
+
(
TARGt −
pt−1
pt
TARGt−1
)
(D5)
Finally, in addition to the Φt distortion and its implications for labour supply
and labour income, the only thing that changes (relative to the model used so far
16
for the study of the debt crisis) is the treatment of public debt. In particular,
we now assume that public debt is the public financing variable that adjusts
residually to close the goverment’s budget identity. Recall that, by contrast,
during the economic adjustment program, we assumed that it was TARGET2
liabilities that played this role with the public debt to GDP ratio set as in the
data. Following usual practice, in order to ensure dynamic stability, we assume
that TARGET2 liabilites react to deviations of public debt, dt, from its initial
2019 value, d2019, according to the following feedback (Taylor-type) policy rule:
(TARGt −
pt−1
pt
TARGt−1) = γ
TARG(TARGt−1 −
pt−2
pt−1
TARGt−2)+
+(1− γTARG)(TARG2019 −
pt−1
pt
TARG2018) + γ
d(dt − d2019) (D6)
where 0 ≤ γTARG ≤ 1 is an autoregressive parameter, (TARG2019−pt−1pt TARG2018)
is the change in TARGET2 liabilities prior to the pandemic crisis as implied by
our numerical solution in the previous sections and γd is a feedback fiscal policy
coeffi cient. For our numerical simulations, we set γTARG and γd at 0.9 and 0.1
respectively.
The rest of the equations remain as in Appendix C above.
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